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ABSTRACT 
In the end of 20th century the merger wave swept across the technological industry. Tens of 
thousands of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) were executed through the information 
technology industry and the technology companies’ stock prices were reaching all-time 
records. In many occasions the acquisition’s premiums were miserably overvalued and the 
acquirer paid significant overcompensation for the takeover target. The bubble was burst, 
and the information technology stocks became crashing down.  
 
The research problem of this thesis is to focus on identifying the explanatory factors that 
explain the performance differences between mergers executed during the Information 
technology pre-bubble and post-bubble situations. The empirical part is conducted in form 
of event study in which the acquirer merger performance is measured on short-and long-term 
time frame on Nordic data. Data period covers the time frame of 1995 up to until 2006 and 
the sample consists of 132 deals conducted by Nordic Technology firms. The merger 
performance is mirrored against the benchmark of other Nordic Technology firms which 
were not involved with transactions in the specified time period. The merger performance is 
measured with market model and buy-and hold abnormal returns.   
 
The review of previous literature indicates that the market structure and the unique quality 
of the products of information technology industry affect the strategic motives behind the 
merger strategy and to the valuation methods of the intangible assets. In the contrast with the 
findings of previous literature the acquisitions have the tendency to underperform the markets 
and the empirical results of the thesis are in line with previous research.  
KEYWORDS: Mergers, Acquisitions, Information Technology, Markets, Strategy, 
Intangible Assets, Valuation, Long-term performance, Short-term performance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As a result of depression in Finland and Sweden in the beginning of 1990s, the interest rates 
increased heavily due to the declining asset prices and the following depreciation of debtors’ 
collaterals. The rapid economic boom in the 1980s and the financial deregulation across the 
European financial markets lead to a bubble which went bust in the Nordics in the beginning 
of 1990s. This caused the severe economic meltdown in the Nordics in the beginning of 90s. 
The economy recovered due to the governmental interventions and the interest rates started 
to decrease again after 1992. In Finland the knowledge led information technology industry 
led by Nokia contributed heavily on economic expansion of the rest of the 1990s and the 
lower interest rates encouraged companies to seek out un-organic growth through 
acquisitions and mergers. This development lead to a new tech bubble which burst in 2001.1  
   
This thesis will examine the Nordic merger and acquisition market through three different 
time periods, which cover the whole inspection period of 1995-2006, pre-crises period of 
1995-1999 and post-crises period of 2001-2006.  The empirical part studies the acquirer’s 
stock price performance after acquisition date and compares the profitability between short-
and long-term financial performance of the acquirer during pre-crises and after dot-com 
crises periods. The crises period during August 1999 until August 2001 itself is excluded 
from the study to increase result reliability. The information technology industry market 
structure and the intangible nature of products and services are included as part of the study.  
The data is gathered from the Nordic markets, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, on 
the time periods specified above. The chosen industry concentrates on information 
technology & telecommunication markets and companies. 
 
1.1. The Purpose of the Thesis and Intended Contribution 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the short- and long-term financial performance of 
acquirer companies in Nordic Markets. The acquirer companies are divided into two groups. 
First acquirer group consists of companies that are classified as telecommunication or high 
technology industry enterprises. The second acquirer group includes companies from other 
industries that have bought a telecommunication or high technology target company. All the 
companies are publicly traded in Nordic stock exchanges to solve data availability problem 
                                                 
1 Kiander 2004 p. 1-15. 
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concerning private companies. The information technology company valuation, nature of 
products and industry as well as merger and acquisition theory are presented as theoretical 
framework for the thesis.  
  
Previous merger related literature and studies indicate that mergers tend to cluster up in to 
certain trend driven waves that are clearly identifiable by looking back in the historical 
merger activity. In the US, there are six longer periods since 1890s, when merger activity has 
clustered and increased above its’ normal levels. The studies offer two opposite explanations 
to explicate this phenomenon. First explanation argues that the waves occur in certain 
periods, because unexpected shock forces companies to adapt fast for changes in their 
operating environment. These sudden environmental changes can be caused by new 
technological innovations, unexpected fluctuations of commodity prices or the rise of 
substitute products. The industry structure defines the length and impacts of these shocks. 
Some industries could be affected more deeply from these shocks than other industries. One 
way to survive these shocks is to acquire competitor companies and seek out competitive 
advantage over the industry through external growth. Second, rival explanation theory, 
suggests that merger trends are driven by misevaluations, where buyers use overvalued stocks 
to buy the stocks of lower valued firms. The second theory is linked to the availability of 
cheap capital, which increases the investment opportunities of buyers. The second theory has 
stronger scientific support, because the operating environmental shocks by themselves do not 
tend to start increased merger activity, whereas low cost of investment capital tends to form 
merger waves. (DePamphilis 2012: 13-15) 
 
Usually the merger activity increases in the times of merger waves. This means that, when 
the interest rate levels are low and money is offered to the market operators in a form of 
cheap loans. The market operators take these cheap loans to finance their investment 
activities and one of these investment opportunities are mergers. The low interest rates and 
cheap loans encourage companies to merge and acquire lucrative companies to boost up their 
existing shareholder value, but when the interest rates for loans are low, the risk of 
negligently executed acquisition process could increase due the increased supply of money. 
When companies have vast amount of cheap loan money available, the decision-making 
process could be biased or the due diligence of the acquisition is not throughout forethought 
and this will have direct or indirect effect on the acquirer’s stock performance. The focus of 
this study is to compare the acquirer’s stock performance in short-term after the acquisition 
announcement day with the long-term stock performance and benchmark the returns against 
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the industry returns. The time frame of the inspection window is divided into two parts and 
it follows the bubble period. First time window starts at l of January 1995 and ends at August 
1999, just before the global escalation of Dot-com crises, and the second time period includes 
the post-crises period starting at August 2001 and ending at December 2006.The whole 
inspection window covers both previously mentioned periods and the bubble period itself. 
The internet bubble period is usually included in the fifth merger wave in the US financial 
history. The fifth wave covers the time period from 1992 up to 2000 and it is called the age 
of strategic mega mergers (Depamphilis 2012: 15).  
 
The intended contribution of this study is to provide results concerning the mergers 
performance on the Nordic markets on short-and long-term time frame. There are several 
research papers concerning the U.S merger market during the Dot-com crises providing 
results that lights up the interest to study, if the Nordic markets have similar effects than U.S 
markets. Even though there are some papers concerning the Nordic merger performance 
during the financial crises of 2007, the number of papers studying the Dotcom period is very 
limited. The scientific ambition to study this specific subject is to observe if Nordic 
technology markets behave in accordance with their American counterpart and how the 
acquiring companies performed in comparison with their industry. Interesting study 
concerning one part of the Nordics, was drafted by Jakobsen and Voetmann (2003). They 
studied Danish publicly listed acquirer performance on short-and long-term during 1993-
1997 in Danish markets.  They found out that the acquirers underperform the Danish markets 
9.4 percent after three years, but still the long-term abnormal return was not far from zero 
and thus acquirers did not significantly underperform the market. They explain the finding 
with volatility effect, which may distort long term returns due to the right skewness of log 
returns. Their results are attained from time period that overlaps partly with the first time 
period of this thesis, so it will be interesting to compare, if Nordic markets and other Nordic 
countries provide similar kind of results.  
 
1.2. The Research Hypotheses  
 
The merger performance can be measured with different methods varying from long-time- 
and short-time profitability, accounting based ratios, integration process performance, 
innovation performance and as well as many other measurement tools. The most commonly 
used methods of measuring the merger performance by scholars are short-and long-term 
financial performance, accounting-based performance and key individuals’ assessments of 
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overall merger performance. For this thesis the selected methods are short-and long-term 
financial performance, because the access to data is not restricted by confidentiality 
agreements or trade agreements. The previous research papers that use short-term financial 
performance method usually examine the short time window around the acquisition 
announcement date and compare the expected returns of the acquisition with average 
acquisition expected returns of the industry that are not affected by the event. Researchers 
using the accounting-based approach usually compare the post-merger returns of the 
acquiring company with the pre-merger returns of the acquiring company. The Scholars using 
the long-term financial performance extend the examination time window to several months 
or years instead of days or weeks and they measure realized returns instead of expected 
returns. (Faulkner, Teerikangas & Joseph 2012: 118-121).  
 
The previous research literature regarding the merger returns for acquirer’s short-term 
performance is somehow contradictory. For example, Schoenberg’s findings (2006) 
concluded that 50 percent of cross-border acquisitions made by British acquirers between 
years 1988-90 created negative abnormal returns for acquirers. Also, Papadakis & Thanos 
(2010) found in their study that 52 percent of domestic acquisitions in Greece provided 
negative abnormal returns for acquirers. According to the studies of Carper (1990), 
Martynova, Oosting & Renneboog (2006) and Shantanu & Vijay (2009) the mergers did not 
provide excess returns for the acquiring companies. Interesting finding concerning the excess 
returns was concluded by Limmack (1991). His result underlined that the mergers and 
acquisitions provide abnormal returns for the stockholders of the target company, but not for 
the acquiring company. In fact, the mergers and acquisitions tend to have value decreasing 
effect for the stockholders of acquirer. The results also indicate that the wealth gains for 
target companies are made at the expense of acquirer. By observing findings of previous 
studies, the first hypothesis is formed.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Mergers and acquisitions did not provide abnormal returns for acquirer’s 
stockholders in Nordic-markets neither in short-term or long-term time frame. 
 
Jensen & Ruback (1983) obtained different results than previously mentioned papers. They 
concluded that takeovers provide positive returns for the shareholders of target company, but 
do not decrease the shareholder value of acquiring company. The positive returns are not 
caused at the expense of acquirer’s shareholder wealth. Healy, Palepu & Ruback (1992) 
found out that there is positive correlation between improved operational cash flow measures 
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and long-term abnormal returns and acquirer’s merger activity. The mergers increase the 
acquirers’ profitability. Loughran and Vijh (1997) summarized their findings with interesting 
fact concerning tender offers. The buyers with cash based tender offers tend to receive 
abnormal long-term returns from mergers, where as buyers with stock change-based tender 
offers long-term returns tend to be negative. This implies that market participants could not 
react to merger announcement information efficiently. The economic turmoil periods also 
affect the merger performance through managerial decision making. Campello, Graham & 
Harvey (2010) interviewed over one thousand Chief financial officers (CFO) around the 
world regarding their investing activity during the financial crisis. Almost 90 percent of the 
financially troubled companies had to cut their investment activity due to the financial crisis. 
Their findings indicate that economics crisis periods may cause difference in merger returns 
between different time periods through managerial decision making and this effect may last 
longer than the actual crises period. These studies form the base of the second and third 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Acquisitions did not provide positive buy-and hold abnormal returns on the 
long term. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a difference between pre-crises buy-and hold abnormal returns and 
post-crises buy-and hold abnormal returns created by mergers and acquisitions.   
 
1.3 Research Problem and Limitations 
 
Previous research has criticized the method of using the short-term performance as 
measurement methodology, when investigating the merger performance. Montgomery & 
Wilson (1986) criticize the fact that short-term performance is not describing the actual 
performance of acquirer, but rather the investor expectations. The event-based studies are 
underlined by the expectations of investors and these expectations are priced accordingly as 
part of prices, the actual post-merger performance is not properly taken into account. To 
minimize this limitation, the study extends the methodology to long-term performance as 
well.  
 
Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) address the limitations caused by the financial approach. The 
short-term performance measures only financial impact ignoring other important success 
factors such as employee reactions and integration problems. They also criticize that short-
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term performance methodology can be used only to measure performance of publicly traded 
acquirers. Whereas their critique has to be taken into consideration, this thesis will only focus 
financial performance and publicly traded firms due to the data availability and access. To 
cope with the problems of time window length, five different time windows are used for the 
short-term performance. First event window investigates the price reactions around the 
merger announcement on -1/+1 day period and the second time window concentrates on -
7/+7 day periods before and after the announcement. The remaining time windows are +1 
month, +3 three months and +12 months after announcement date. To ensure sufficient 
coverage for results, the data is collected from time period between 1995-2006. The crisis 
period of highest volatility of August 1999 to August 2001 is excluded to avoid biased results 
caused by the crisis.  For the long-term performance, event windows of 6 months and 12 
months is used in order to avoid the right-skewness problem of long event windows. 
 
1.4. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. The second chapter contains the literature review 
and the frame background for the thesis.  The third chapter introduces the information 
technology markets, the specific features of software and information based products and the 
market structure. The fourth chapter examines the valuation methods and techniques used to 
evaluate the economic value of the companies.  The special elements of information 
technology based valuation are taken in to consideration in this chapter. The fifth chapter 
examines the strategic aspect behind M&A at the viewpoint of seller and buyer. The 
classification of M&A is also included in the chapter five. The sixth chapter specifies the 
different motives for mergers and acquisitions as well as typical acquisition process.  The 
seventh chapter introduces the data and methodology used in the thesis and chapter eight 
presents the findings of the study. The last chapter concludes the results and summarizes the 
main findings, which are vital for hypothesis analysis.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW & MEASURING MERGER 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 
2.1. Merger Waves 
 
2.1.1. Background  
 
Throughout the economic history of the known capitalism era, there have been certain 
specified time periods, when the merger and acquisition activity has increased heavily 
compared to its’ long time average. The earlier merger waves have focused on industry 
sectors which were essential part of industrialization, such as oil, coal and steel industry, and 
the later merger waves concentrate more on more focused and specialized industry sectors, 
such as software, computer electronics or insurance services. On the financial literature five 
different merger waves have been identified and classified as merger wave. The first merger 
wave occurred during the change of 19th and 20th century and the mergers lead to vast 
problems with market structure and competition. Simplified trend of this “Great Merger 
Wave” was that the large corporations bought their smaller rivals out of markets and collected 
so much market power, that they could affect the consumer behavior and market structure. 
The rapid economic development and the lack of antitrust laws caused vastly increased 
merger rate, which usually lead to monopolistic or oligopolistic market competition. Mainly 
due to this development the Congress of U.S passed its first antitrust laws. The second major 
merger wave was just before the Great Depression in 1930s and was fueled by the strong 
economic growth after the First World War. The merger activity was built mainly around oil 
and steel industry, thus not as wide sense than with the first merger wave. The second merger 
wave ended with stock market crash in 1929 and lead to worldwide recession. (Faulkner, 
Teerikangas & Joseph 2012:21-22) 
 
Third merger wave occurred in the 1960s and it was the first merger wave, where the merger 
activity increased on global scale and not only in U.S markets. The economic interaction 
increased between Europe and U.S and the mergers were on more frequent bases cross-border 
transactions with global effect. The wave ended with the global oil crises in year 1973. The 
fourth wave started in early 80s in U.S, Europe and Asia and it lasted until the end of the 
decade. Typical features of this wave were the use of cash as form of merger price payment, 
big target company size and hostile takeovers. Also, the deregulation of antitrust laws and 
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lowered willingness antitrust officials to sue mergers encouraged and strengthened the wave.  
(Faulkner & etc. 2012:22-23) 
 
The fifth merger wave took place in 1990s and it focused around highly technological 
innovations and intellectual property. Typically, the target companies held more intangible 
assets in their balance sheet than tangible assets, which distorted the proper valuation. The 
wave peaked in end of 1990s and the high-technology bubble burst just after the turn of new 
millennia. The fifth wave went hand by hand with globalization development on the global 
scale, which ensured that the fall had global impact (Faulkner & etc. 2012: 23-25). The 
research topic of this thesis is dated in the end of fifth merger wave and for research purposes 
the impact area is restricted to Nordic markets. The companies are classified as high 
technology operators, which have merged or acquired publicly traded Information 
Technology companies during the examination period.  
 
 
 
2.1.2. Merger Wave Drivers 
 
Mirroring against the five known merger waves stated earlier, a conclusion can be drawn that 
the drivers behind merger activity and the market trends have varied heavily during different 
merger waves. In the earlier merger waves the driver motivation was built around the concept 
of industry consolidation and market power and the fifth merger wave focused on high 
technology innovation and vast amounts of intellectual property. There has been extensive 
amount of research concerning the merger drivers during the merger waves and next the 
thesis will cover the essential studies covering the fifth merger wave and its drivers.  
 
Jarrad Harford examined in his paper (2005)  the merger drivers and his findings are 
consistent with the neoclassical theory’s assumptions, which explain the increased merger 
activity by industry related shocks in their operating environment. Usually these shocks are 
drastic changes in regulatory-, economic- or technological environment. Hartford adds the 
requirement of capital re-allocation and sufficient capital liquidity to execute capital re-
allocation. According to Harford’s findings merger waves need strong economic reasons and 
adequately low transaction costs to make mergers lucrative options. Sufficiently low 
transaction cost levels will mirror to transaction activity by increasing their number (Harford 
2005: 530-533, 558-559). 
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Shleifer & Vishny (2003) study the behavioral approach as merger driver. According to their 
findings they underline the importance and amount of target companies’ stock valuations as 
merger driver and that fore the main cause for increased merger activity. Their application 
model takes mispricing as given and specifies the rationality of acquiring overvalued stock 
valuation. This enables companies to use stock as payment method of their acquisitions, 
instead of cash, and ensure growth. The companies with undervalued or more realistic stock 
valuation were more likely to be more probable take-over targets than the companies with 
overvalued stock price. This encourages aggressive behavior of buying undervalued 
companies and growing through mergers (Shleifer & Vishny 2003: 309). Richard Roll 
presents in his research paper (1986) supporting evidence upon the behavioristic approach. 
He summarizes his discovery around the concept of managerial hubris. Managerial hubris 
mixed with bidding offers may cause managers to pay extra price for take-over target and 
this leads to valuation errors. (Roll 1986: 212-214).  On the other hand, Gorton, Kahl & 
Rosen combine the offered merger wave explanations provided by behavioral approach and 
neoclassical theory in their paper (2009). 
 
They studied the fifth merger wave of 1990s and found out that the firm size has serious 
impact on merger activity on industry sectors, whereas the economy of scale is important 
competition factor. They build their findings around the two unquestionable assumptions 
concerning the merger waves. First fact is derived from neo-classical theory and it states that 
the buyer’s stock value decreases on the date, when the merger is announced to public. The 
second fact presents that merger activity tend to increase on industry sectors, where the target 
companies has experienced radical board or management changes due to acquisitions. The 
value maximization is the main goal for managers in mergers and the board management 
changes are necessary to replace the old management with new managers to maximize the 
merger value. According to their findings they underline the survival instincts of managers 
to keep their position in companies and to ensure their positions, the management is ready 
conduct mergers as defensive maneuver. This will increase the firm size and the bigger the 
firm size will get, the more unlikely it is to be targeted as merger target. They rationalize 
their conclusions with defensive mergers that occur to prevent the take-over possibility from 
competing firms and as the firm size increases the less profitable the merger returns will 
become. The outcome can be identified especially in industry sectors, where the companies 
have major economies of scale. (Gorton, Kahl & Rosen 2009: 1292-1296, 1328-1329) 
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Following the main explanation of neo-classical theory that increased merger wave activity 
is consequence of regulatory-, economic-, or technologic shocks in companies’ operational 
environment, Ovtchinnikov investigated in his paper (2013) the effect of industry 
deregulation as a cause for increased merger activity. Regarding his findings the merger 
waves are preceded by industry related deregulation of laws and acts, which indicate the 
decreased level of control over the deregulated industry. Loosened control encourages 
companies to take bigger risks and execute practices that might have been forbidden before 
the deregulation took effect. Usually the deregulated industry is performing poorly, and 
certain interest groups are lobbying the lawmakers to intervene this development by easing 
the legal frame regulating the industry. (Ovtchinnikov 2013: 73) 
 
 
2.2. Short-term Financial Performance 
 
The merger performance has been a well-researched topic among the strategy and finance 
literature and performance metrics vary according to the research interests of the researchers. 
Generally, several studies indicate that the target companies have higher short-term returns 
than the markets without the merger event. Sudarsanam & Mahete (2006) and Arnold & 
Parker (2007) found out that target companies provide higher returns due to the bidding 
premiums paid by the acquiring companies. These premiums are usually paid at the expense 
of the acquirer company’s stockholders. The results concerning the acquirers’ short-term 
performance are more or less contradictory. Some studies (Martynova et.al 2006; Shantanu 
2009; Carper 1990) state that mergers did not produce significant abnormal returns for the 
acquiring companies and some studies (Padakis & Thanos 2010; Schoenberg 2006) indicate 
that almost half or majority of mergers did provide positive significant abnormal returns for 
the acquirer as well as significant negative abnormal returns. The contradiction might be 
caused by the critic brought against the way of measuring short-term performance. 
Montgomery & Wilson (1986) criticize the measurement methodology of short term 
performance, which focuses on investor expectations and not the actual acquirer post-merger 
performance. Their criticism is justified in contrast with the contradiction of results. To 
conclude the trend of short-term merger performance is to acknowledge the tendency of 
acquisitions to destroy the acquirers’ shareholder value.  
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2.3. Long-term Financial Performance 
 
Several researchers have studied the long-term performance of acquirer companies in 
addition to short-term performance to bring robustness to the results. The long-term 
performance does not suffer the need of longitudinal data and it measures the actual returns 
instead of investor expectations, which is under criticism and brought up in Montgomery’s 
and Wilson’s paper (1986). The event window is usually extended to several months or even 
years. The previous research results are also somehow contradictory, but overall trend shows 
that mergers do not generate significant positive abnormal returns. Tuch & O’Sullivan (2007) 
found out that acquisitions in U.S and U.K markets provided negative abnormal returns on 
the long-run for the acquiring firms and their stockholders. Sudarsanam & Mahate (2006) 
concluded in their paper that almost half of the acquisitions measured produced significant 
negative abnormal returns on the long-term. Surprisingly, the other half of the acquisitions 
returned significant positive abnormal returns. 
 
 They underline the methodological problems of extended time windows, because the right 
skewness of log returns over time may distort the results considerably. The problem is 
underlined also in Jakobsen’s and Voetmann’s paper (2003), which was conducted on Danish 
data. They offer the wealth relative approach to answer the right-skewness problem of long- 
time periods, but it does not erase the rebalancing- or new listing bias presented by Barber & 
Lyon (1997). The best way to control these methodological challenges is to keep the time 
window relatively short. In this thesis, the longest event time window is set to 12 months in 
order to control the right skewness problem.  
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3. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY & MARKETS 
 
 
3.1. Products and Services 
 
The Information technology (IT) markets differ from markets, where normal products are 
produced and consumed. This difference can be explained by the nature of the information 
technology market’s products and services, which are mainly intangible. The information 
technology markets include Internet-, email- and mobile services, computer hardware and 
software services, music related services, video and movie services and many other important 
branches of intangible services. There are certain special features that separate IT-markets 
from normal markets according to Oz. The features can be classified as followed: 
 
1) Complementarity, compatibility & standards. The products of information technology 
markets are complements, which mean that the consumers do not buy an individual product 
but an entirety of products instead and this entirety will form a functioning system. For 
example, computer hardware needs the software system to operate and together they form a 
functioning entity. The successful production of these complementarity products requires 
that products must be compatible. This means that software must have similar specifications 
with computer hardware to operate properly. Otherwise the system does not work. The 
producers use standards to define the compatibility between products. In practice this means 
that these complementary products must be produced on the same standard to operate 
together.  
 
2) Externalities of production. This means the utility that consumers get when they consume 
the product and how this utility is affected by the number of other consumers’ consumption 
of similar or compatible products. The pace and method how consumers adopt new standard 
have an effect on market firms’ behavior and production decisions. A new product or service 
must have adequate consumer base to become widely consumed product. 
 
3) Switching costs and lock-in situations. Usually consumers have familiarized themselves 
with a certain operating system and find difficult to change it to another alternative system. 
The switch to a new system forces consumers to learn new interface and this takes time and 
effort. This spent time and effort are called switching costs. Consumers, who are trapped in 
the old system or services, are in lock-in situations, where they find it hard to change into 
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new service. The degree of lock-in situations can be calculated from switching costs caused 
by exchange of service producer or product. Varian and Shapiro (2004) classify lock-in 
situations to contract-, training & learning-, data conversion-, search cost- and loyalty cost 
based lock-ins. In the contract based lock-in situation the customers are bind by the terms of 
long term contract and the violations of the contract cause compensation penalty. This 
penalty is considered as a switching cost. Training and learning of how to use new system 
can cause lock-in situation, when the user base of the old product is vast. It will take a lot of 
time and money to train all consumers to use the new system, and this time is away from 
production. The lost production causes switching costs. Lock-in caused by data conversion 
means that huge number of older data must be converted to fit into new format and expenses 
from this operation are considered as switching costs. Search costs are costs that are caused, 
when consumers buy new systems and try to find a suitable system to replace the antiquated 
system. To avoid this consumer might hang on the old system longer than necessary. 
Switching older system to new one may result switching cost in a form of losing benefits 
offered by the old system provider. Consumers might prefer to stay with the old system if 
they don’t want to lose those perks. These costs are called loyalty costs. 
 
4) Significant economies of scale. In the information technology markets new technological 
innovations and products are expensive to develop and to test. So, the new products and 
software have big sunken costs compared to the later copies of the product or software. For 
instance, the first software prototype takes several millions to develop and to test before the 
commodity is ready for market launch, but the second copy of the original commodity cost 
only fraction of the expenses compared with money invested in the prototype creation. The 
later copies are usually sold for couple of dollars to the consumers. Internet offers the 
infrastructure to spread new copies almost free, so these low marginal costs compared to high 
sunken costs inflicts vast decline of cost function after next generation copies are sold to the 
consumers. (Oz 2001:1-7). 
 
The nature of the products in information technology based markets is that the most of the 
products are used in different systems, networks or through Internet. These systems are 
compiled from many components and they are able to function only if components fit 
together and they are integrated to operate. This hardware needs software to be functional 
and even the best hardware is useless without proper applications. This means that 
information technology products are considered as complement products, which leads to that 
value of one component will be increased substantially by the existence of another 
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component. For example, when more software is available for the hardware and more flexible 
operating base of the hardware exists, the value of the components will increase (Varian 
2006: 650). In the information technology markets manufacturers selling complementary 
products are equally meaningful, which leads into a situation that company cannot compete 
unless their component is compatible with the rest of the system and all its components. So, 
the information technology component manufacturers have to concentrate on their 
competitors and also the manufacturers, who produce complementary products (Shapiro & 
Varian 1999: 10).  
 
3.2. Production and Manufacturing 
 
The information technology markets are considered as quite concentrated markets due to the 
significance of the economies of scale. This concentration causes reduced competition 
between the market parties and usually dominant firms capture most of the markets. New 
information technology is expensive to develop and to test, and these costs must be paid 
before the product or service start to pay back the investment. There is no guarantee that the 
new technology will bring back the invested funds and the risk to lose the original investment 
is probable. The research and development costs are sunken costs, because those costs cannot 
be recovered. The high fixed costs lower the willingness to invest into new technology, the 
simplicity to copy developed products and the low variable costs of copies make product 
development pretty unfavorable option (Varian 2006: 651-656).   
 
The companies need legal protection for their products that have been developed through 
expensive research & development process to prevent the competitors of stealing their 
innovations. The companies can apply patent protection for their new products and get an 
exclusive right of commercial exploitation for the product. A patent is defined as a legal 
document that provides the holder sole right to benefit from product for certain number of 
years2 and it’s issued by government agency. Patents are the method of encouraging 
companies to practice research & development and create new inventions. The patent system 
provides patent holders temporarily monopoly status and can distort market competition. In 
the information technology industry patents are widely used method of protecting new 
inventions and products (Oz 1996:233-235). 
                                                 
2 In Finland patents are granted by government agency Patentti-ja rekisterihallitus and the protection period of 
sole exploit right is 20 years. In US the protection period is 17 years.  
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3.3. IT-market Structure 
 
The network industries are exposed to similar market forces than any other markets, but the 
nature of the products and services makes IT-markets very different than ordinary tangible 
product markets. The information technology is mainly used to process and exploit data and 
information. Some of this information technology may be considered as intellectual property. 
Many innovations are protected by patents and research & development costs are high. In 
addition to these features, the intangible nature of product and services, unlimited amounts 
of information, high fixed costs and low marginal costs lead to price discrimination. The sole 
right to exploit new technological innovations gives companies significant competitive 
advantage and the patent protection is one of the major reasons, why IT-markets are pretty 
concentrated with only few market operators. The high switching costs cause lock-in 
situations and this makes the competition for customers tough (Varian, Farrell & Shapiro 
2011: 4-30).                                     
 
There are only two sustainable structures for information technology based markets. First 
structure is the dominant firm model. In this model the dominant firm has cost advantage 
over its smaller competitors due to its size, market power and economies of scale. The second 
model is the differentiated product model, where certain numbers of firms are producing 
same kind of product or service, but they offer this product in many different varieties. There 
are two different strategies to compete depending on the markets that the firm operates. If the 
firm is operating in differentiated markets, it must add extra value to the information and this 
way try to differentiate itself from its competitors. This strategy is called product 
differentiation strategy. The cost leadership strategy is suitable for dominant firm markets, 
where the dominant firm acquires competitive advantage through economies of scope and 
scale. As a summary, the information technology markets consist of firms that are either 
dominant agents with huge market power and market share or smaller firms that differentiate 
themselves from competitors (Shapiro, Varian 1999:24-29).  
 
The nature of the information technology goods leads usually to concentrated markets and 
examination of the M&A process indicate that the market power and share is an important 
factor, when the antitrust officials monitor the effects of the merger on the market 
competition and consumer  welfare. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is method of 
measuring the market concentration and it is also the figure that antitrust officials calculate 
before accepting the merger. HHI is calculated by squaring market share of each firm that 
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operates in the markets and summing the resulted numbers together. The HHI can range from 
0 into 10 000 and it’s formally expressed as followed: 
 
 
 
(1) HHI=∑ (𝑠𝑖)2𝑁𝑖=1  
 
where, 
 
 S= market share of the firm 
 
The closer the firm is to achieve full monopoly status, the more near the HHI value is to 
10 000. The zero value of HHI will indicate perfect market competition. 
(Oz 1996: 173) 
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4. VALUATION METHODS OF M&A 
 
The modern financial theory uses valuation models to define corporation’s value. This value 
varies depending on which model is used at the valuation process. Asset based valuation 
models specify the value of a company from the assets of its balance sheet. This model adds 
all property items together and company’s value is the sum of these items. Market based 
valuation determinates the company’s value by comparing it with other companies in similar 
circumstances (Nilson & Öhlin 1984: 13-18). The valuation process can be executed by 
looking at the future development aspects of the company and analyzing financial statements 
and other public financial data. This approach is called Going-Concern and its focus is 
strongly future orientated. The second approach is liquidation, which concentrates on to 
accredit company’s assets in the moment of termination (Chiu & Siegel 1989: 175-183). 
 
 
4.1. Valuation Models 
 
4.1.1. Income and cashflow based models 
 
 
The incorporated companies can be divided to limited liability companies and to public 
companies. Public companies’ shares can be traded publicly in stock exchange, where the 
public companies have listed their shares. Limited liability companies’ stocks are not traded 
in stock exchange, but the private partners own the share capital of the company instead. The 
valuation method is different depending which kind company is under the valuation process. 
The limited liability company’s valuation determination is more likely to be asset based, 
because publicly traded stock price indicator does not exist. Public corporations are easier to 
value, because stocks market price offers determinant to build up the valuation process. Also, 
other valuation methods can be used to define public corporation’s value, such as market 
based approach and income based approach. In this thesis the focus is in the public 
corporation’s valuation process ( Immonen 2008: 6-36). 
 
The Income approach takes future cash flows and expected returns into account when 
defining the corporations’ value. The future cash flows and expected returns must be 
discounted to their Present Value by adding up the various cash flows: 
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(2) 𝑃𝑉 =
𝐶1
(1+𝑟)
+ 
𝐶2
(1+𝑟)2
+
𝐶𝑇
(1+𝑟)𝑇
 
 
 where, 
PV= present Value 
r = discount rate 
C = cash flow 
T = time of the cash flow 
 
This is called discounted cash flow (DCF) formula. When defining the net present value 
(NPV) any immediate cash flows must added to present value. 
 
(3) NPV  =   𝐶0 + 𝑃𝑉 
 
where, 
PV = present value 
𝐶0 = initial cash flow 
 
The cash flows must be discounted for two reasons. First money is worth more today than 
tomorrow and second safe money is more valuable than risky money (Brealey, Myers & 
Allen 2011: 49-67). 
 
The discount rate can be determined with Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or calculating 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). 
 
 
(4) CAPM  = 𝐸(𝑟𝑚)- 𝑟𝑓= 𝛽𝑖[E(𝑟𝑚)-𝑟𝑓] 
 
where, 
E (𝑟𝑚) = expected return of the market 
𝑟𝑓 = risk free interest rate 
𝛽𝑖 = sensitivity of the excess asset returns to the expected excess market returns 
(Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2005: 281-316) 
Certain assumptions must be taken into consideration, when using the CAPM.  
 
 
31 
 
(5)  After-tax WACC= 𝑟𝐷(1 − 𝑇𝑐 ) 
𝐷
𝑉 
+  𝑟𝐸  
𝐸
𝑉
 
 
where, 
 𝑟𝐷 = cost of debt 
𝑇𝑐 = corporate tax rate 
D = total amount of debt 
E = shareholder’s equity 
𝑟𝐸= cost of equity 
V = value of the firm 
(Brealey 2011: 452-456) 
 
 
The free cash flow model (FCF) is used to value the enterprise value. The discretionary 
actions of financial statements do not affect the cash flows and this is why it is good measure 
of value.  The free cash flow model can be calculated as followed: 
 
(6)  FCF𝑡= NOPAT𝑡-capital expenditures±∆net working capital 
 
where,  
NOPAT𝑡= net operating profit after taxes in time t 
capital expenditures = funds used to upgrade or acquire new physical assets 
change in net working capital = current assets-current liabilities 
 
The FCF can be used to define the free cash flow to equity (FCFE) or the whole value of the 
firm (FCFF). The choice, which valuation method to use, depends on the situation at hand.  
(Arzac 2011: 15-16) 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2. Market and asset based models 
 
Public corporation’s value can be specified by multiplying the number of its shares with the 
stock’s market price. This value is based on the conception what investors have on the 
company’s’ future potential. Market values’ information content depends considerably from 
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the financial market efficiency. So, the market value does not perceive the vital other factors 
that are intrinsic in business valuation process. There are several methods to amplify market 
based value and this amplified value take intrinsic factors into account. The methods to 
measure these intrinsic values are company’s market valued potential, Firm’s value ratio to 
yields and value ratio to dividend returns (Laitinen 2002: 66-69). 
 
Market based value can also be defined by using valuation by comparables. In this valuation 
process similar firms are identified and then compared with the firm under the valuation 
process. Then examination is focused on how much these comparable firms’ investors are 
willing to pay for every dollar of assets or earnings. In the asset based approach the market 
value based equity is compared with book value of the equity. The second approach compares 
the stock price with the earnings of the company. This value is put to comparison with 
competitors’ similar values. Usually the market value is higher than company’s book value, 
but exceptions occur in two situations. At first the book value can be exactly the same as the 
market value or second it can be less appreciated. Another way to measure company’s value 
is to appreciate its’ property from the balance sheet (Brealey 2011: 105-106). 
 
 
 
4.1.3. Estimation models 
 
Business valuation can be put into practice by using estimates. Estimation models are based 
on return on investments (ROI) requirement, which states that profits must be larger than the 
actual invested capital. The ROI-figure lacks capability to estimate long–term economic 
value creation and even with shorter time periods problems may occur. For example, when 
division makes new investment that provides lower return percentage than original profit. In 
this situation the divisions’ combined ROI is reduced and the good investment opportunity 
is not utilized. Economic value added (EVA) model offers a solution to ROI-models’ 
deficiency. EVA brings additional variable, which includes divisions’ risk-adjusted capital 
costs and then are multiplied net investment base of the division. This calculation provides 
the divisions’ capital charge, which is subtracted from income before taxes to attain EVA. 
EVA is also known as residual income (Kaplan & Atkinson 1998: 505-509). 
 
 
(7) ROI= NIBTAssets 
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where, 
NIBT = net income before taxes 
Assets = division’s asset base 
(Kaplan:1998:505) 
 
 
(8) EVA = NOPAT-(c*K) 
 
 
where,  
c = capital charge 
K=capital employed 
NOPAT= net operating profit after taxes 
(Kaplan:1998:507) 
 
In the EVA model the value of the stock is the book value of the stock added with the future 
financial values. Part of the value of the stock comes from the book value of the equity 
acquired from financial statements and that is why the estimation errors of future profits do 
not have decisive impact on the results that model gives. This is because discounted cash 
flow is result of subtraction of net operating profit and capital charge.   
(Silverman 2010: 10-14). 
 
4.2. Valuation of IT-companies 
 
To evaluate the values of the companies that operate in the IT-industry is more challenging, 
because the specific nature of the markets and the amount of intangible assets. Next this 
thesis presents the typical valuation methods used in IT-company valuation and some specific 
features that affect the valuation.  
 
4.2.1. Deciding the valuation drivers 
 
Determining the valuation method for IT-companies, it is essential to be familiar with the 
unique features of IT-companies. The asset-based models give fairly truthful values to 
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tangible and physical assets and  income-based models can be used to determine the value of 
future cash flows. Still the valuation of intangible assets; goodwill, innovation based 
intellectual property, brand and know-how, is much harder task. To understand the valuation 
process in a more detailed level, it is important to focus on the growth rate of a company and 
in which cycle of growth the company is going. Typically, the information technology 
companies grow fast and they are relatively young when they merge or somebody buys them.  
There are two general features that can be identified when valuing an IT-company, the fast 
growth rate and the invested capital that runs through the income statements. This invested 
capital is poured into the company to finance the customer pool expansion, instead of 
acquiring fixed assets to the balance sheet. This abnormal development of IT-companies 
makes the use of traditional short-term valuation methods, such as price-to-earnings or 
income multiple analyses, very difficult. In the valuation, the examining period should be 
longer, rather 5 to 10 years, and the focus should be on the economic fundamentals, which 
concentrate on future cash flows instead of poured capital investments. (Copeland, Koller & 
Murrin 2000: 315-317). 
 
The valuation of fast growing IT-company should be started on the long-term performance 
of the company, instead of examining the present performance.  The Industry environment, 
where the young IT-startups operate, will be unstable for the next years, because of the rapid 
growth and large capital investments. After the growing stage of this industry, the markets 
will eventually mature and achieve sustainable market balance and structure.  The proper 
valuation must be based on educated assumptions made from the market data. These forecasts 
have to be realistically drawn and there should be several forecast outcome options available. 
These scenarios should be given their probability weight factor and calculate the average 
performance figures for the company. The valuation drivers are very different depending on 
the source of the competition advantage. If the advantage is based on Intellectual property 
rights or customer satisfaction and loyalty, then the impact factor of these drivers should be 
larger than other impact factors in the valuation process. (Copeland, Koller & Murrin 2000: 
317-320). 
 
4.2.2. The Valuation intangible assets 
 
The IT-companies differ from firms, which operate in more traditional industries, what 
comes to the quality of assets. Whereas the traditional business field firms have mostly 
tangible assets, the majority of assets of IT-firms are regarded as intangible assets. The 
35 
 
unique feature of this asset type needs its own valuation methods. The successful execution 
of IT-merger requires the throughout and proper valuation of this asset type, otherwise there 
is a risk of paying too large acquisition premium.  The leading valuation professor, Aswath 
Damodaran, lists the main characteristics of the firm with intangible assets. First feature is 
incoherent accounting concerning the investments in intangible assets.  The first basic rule 
of accounting states that capital expenses and operating expenses have to be separated from 
each other, but IT-firms treat for example research & development expenses as operating 
expenses, instead of capital expenses. This leads to smaller capital expenditures, which may 
indicate smaller growth potential and size. The second feature in the behavior of IT-
companies is that they tend to take less credit than traditional firms, but these firms operate 
in the early growth stage and are venture financed. The third feature is the compensation 
system of the IT-based firms. Because these firms rely on their human resource capital, the 
compensation, in a form of management options and equity-based options, is larger than other 
sectors of industries. (Damodaran 2010: 477-478). 
 
So, in the valuation process of a company with intangible assets, these features have to be 
taken into account and the valuation methods must be adjusted to meet these requirements. 
In addition of using market-, cash flow- or estimation based models, the analyst should 
analyze exogenous growth, make sector comparison and draft careful simplistic adjustments. 
The exogenous growth analysis should concentrate more on future growth estimates, instead 
of observing data from the past or financial fundamentals. The treatment of capital expenses 
as operating expenditures skews the fundamentals. In the sector comparison, analysis should 
concentrate on similar kind of technology firms. Not just the operational similarities, but also 
the life cycle of the firms. The incoherent accounting information skews the accounting 
quality, so it is recommendable to keep valuation adjustment simple to narrow the error 
margin.  (Damodaran 2010: 479) 
 
The accounting consistency must be reclaimed, and this is possible, when the effects of 
intangible asset characteristics are minimized. The Characteristic elimination needs the 
capitalization of R&D expenses. This process starts with an assumption of time that it takes 
to convert the R&D asset into a commercial product. The time this process takes is called 
amortizable life of the R&D asset. This step is followed data collection of the expenses that 
the asset has caused during the last years extending back to the amortization life of the asset. 
Every of these expense items had to be amortized over its amortizable life. This operation 
produces an estimate of value of the asset today.  
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(9) Value of the Research Asset = ∑ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡=𝑜𝑡=−(𝑛−1)
(𝑛+𝑡)
𝑛  
 
 
 
This adjusted value gives the analyst an opportunity to define adjusted book of equity and 
adjusted income: 
 
(10) Adjusted Value of Equity = Book Value of Equity + Value of Research Asset 
 
(11) Adjusted Net Income = Net Income + R&D expenses – Amortization of Research Asset 
(Damodaran 2010: 480- 484). 
 
 
4.2.3. Valuing customer base 
 
In the high growth related information technology industries the customer base forms a major 
value potential, when examining the current and future performance. Assessing the value of 
the customer base is executed through customer value analysis. This analysis consists of five 
elements:  
 
1) The average profit per customer in a year from the customer purchases. 
 
2) The total number of customers 
 
3) The contribution costs of customers 
 
4) The acquiring costs of a customer 
 
5) The customer number lost each year 
 
This information helps the analyst to structure realistic future performance forecasts and 
determine the value of current cash flows. 
(Copeland, Koller & Murrin 2000: 321-325). 
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4.3. The Impact of Financial Structure  
 
In their research paper Mackay & Philips (2005) examined how the industry affects the 
financial structures of firms. This paper provides two significant contributions. Firstly, the 
results indicate that the financial structure is defined by industry related variables rather than 
the fixed effects of the industry. Secondly, the results identify certain interactions between 
financial structure and risk factor. They conclude their study into results that industry factors 
have effect on individual firm decisions, but also joint financial characteristic of the firms, 
which operate in the same industry sector. Their multivariate regression analysis indicates 
that company’s position in the industry compared with its competitors is significant, both 
economically and statistically. The companies adjust their financial structures according the 
actions of their industry rivals. Another significant observation was that, in the highly 
competitive industry sectors, the firms with labor capital cost close to the industry median, 
use smaller amount of debt leverage than the firms, which are positioned farther away from 
the median.  (Mackay & Phillips 2005: 1435-1465). 
 
Maksimovic & Zechner studied the role of debt, agency costs and industry equilibrium. In 
their study, they assume that industry sector firms have possibility to choose between safe 
technology with low lower marginal costs and risky technology with higher or more uncertain 
marginal costs. All firms have an incentive to choose the risky technology and debt based 
financing since it provides higher expected profits than safe technology. The paper concludes 
their research into conclusion, where they found out that, in the industry equilibrium, the 
risky level of project’s cash flow is defined with endogenous approach and this approach is 
dependable on the investments decisions of all firms, which operate in the particular industry. 
The lack of the use of tax advantage in a form of debt money affect the investments decisions 
of all firms in the industries, but this absence does not have effect on the whole value of the 
firms. The firms compensate the losses caused by the failed risky investments with the cash 
flows from the lower risk projects. The absence of tax shield affects the use of debt leverage 
what comes to financing risky projects with debt money. The risk level of the project affects 
the financial structure of companies and the absence of tax advantage of debt money reduces 
risky investments. As Maksimovic & Zechner concluded in their paper, the existence of tax 
shield encourages the firms to make more risky investments, because the losses can be 
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stabilized with cash flows from lower risk profits and the interest rates of debt money can be 
deducted in the taxation. (Maksimovic & Zechner 1991: 1620-1635).  
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5. STRATEGY BEHIND MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
 
Several different motives and goals affect the way how mergers & acquisitions are executed. 
The operational environment and competition regulation set certain procedures that must be 
followed to perform these transactions successfully. The executing practices also differ 
depending on the viewpoint of the acquiring firm or the merging firm. The size, capital 
structure, geographical location and strategic choices have certain impact on the process and 
it is almost impossible to forecast these impacts in advance. The judicial environment 
changes from stable constitutional country into unstable third world country and hence global 
M&A legislation do not exist. M&As can be categorized into national transactions and cross-
border transactions. National transaction take place in a certain country and both merge-treaty 
parties operate in this particular country. Cross-border transactions whereas are carried out 
usually in a country, where the merge-treaty parties do not operate or only the other party 
operates. In addition to the previous classification methods are behavioral, economic and 
political motives. Even though it is challenging to classify M&As, some general features can 
be identified from all transactions (Cooke & Young 1988: 5-15). 
 
In this thesis, the acquisition is defined as a procedure where corporations’ shares are 
assigned to new legal entity or corporation’s whole business, including all assets, are sold to 
acquiring firm. Merger is a narrower concept than acquisition and usually corporations merge 
as part of acquisition. Mergers are one method of executing acquisitions. As a result of 
acquisitions business recourses are concentrated under the same rulership. In merger process 
purchased firm merge to acquiring firm and they create a new legal entity. Purchased firm 
can also cease to exist or it can continue business as a subsidiary company of the acquiring 
firm. Acquisitions can be carried out through diversification, where business operation units 
are diversified and they continue their operations as individual corporations. The business 
function transformations and business dismantling processes are considered as acquisitions 
as well (Immonen 2008: 2-5). Acquisitions that thrive to expanse business volume can be 
divided into horizontal-and vertical acquisitions. Whereas acquisitions that are based on 
diversifying business operations can be divided into conglomerate-and concentric 
acquisitions (Niemi 1991: 11-14). 
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5.1. M&A as Part of the Corporation’s Strategy 
 
 
5.1.1 Buyer 
 
When examining the agents that execute M&A, we have to separate industrial agents from 
capital investment agents. There is a vast difference what comes to goals, methods and 
reasons of M&As between the two agents. Industrial agent is usually an operator, which 
goals, methods and reasons are linked into the scope of business, growth, economies of scale, 
improving profitability and achieving more market share and power. The main advantages 
for industrial agent in M&A; are deletations of overlap operations, economies of scale, 
improved resource management and overall improved efficiency of operations. The most 
important factor behind successful M&A, for industrial agent, is integration of procedure. 
The goals, methods and reasons for capital investment agent are usually linked into expansion 
of business operations though organic growth, increase of profitability and successful use of 
debt leverage. (Katramo, Lauriala, Matinlauri, Niemelä, Svennas & Wilkman 2011: 20-21) 
 
The skills and resources between industrial agents have huge differences. Some of them have 
done several M&As and they have a department that main function is to execute M&As and 
for some industrial agents the M&As might be the first one. The reaction capability of 
industrial agent is slower than capital investment agent. This is mainly due the decision-
making processes, because industrial agent is not planned to exclusively to execute M&As. 
For industrial agent, M&As can be considered as an investments with a long investment 
period and the expectation of returns is based risk premium of industry. This risk premium 
is formed by the subjective concept of the buyer. Where industrial agent focuses on 
synergism advantages, the capital investment agent concentrates on overall returns on 
investment after the presumed investment period. The capital investment agent is not willing 
to keep the investment forever but want to sell the company and make profit. The profit 
margins consist from dividends, capital debt rate returns and increased value of company, 
when they are selling it. (Katramo & et. al. 2011: 21-22) 
 
The capital investment agent can exploit the use of debt money. Their overall expectation of 
returns is built on the expectation return of their own capital equity and to the price of debt 
money.  They can adjust their capital structure in a way that their capital equity is considered 
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as debt instrument and this rate expense is tax deductible from operational cash flow. In 
addition to exploitation of debt money, the capital investment agent has the benefit of capital 
reserves. These reserves form a buffer that capital providers consider as a risk eliminating 
factor and their willingness to offer credit to capital investment agent with a reasonable rate 
increases. The situation is completely different what comes to industrial agent. The more debt 
based financing industrial agent acquires, the bigger risk premium is needed to meet the 
expectations of capital providers. In the end, the threat of bankruptcy will stop the debt based 
financing. The value creation for capital investment agent is based on the debt free enterprise 
value, when they sell the target company.  
 
As a conclusion, the value creation for capital investment agent is formed in three ways. 1) 
The enterprise value is increased through improved profitability 2) The free cash flow of the 
target company is used to pay back the capital equity based investment loan and this increases 
the value of the target company’s equity 3) The target company is sold to industrial agent 
with a market premium. Even though capital investment agent has many advantages over 
industrial agent, they usually do not possess the industry related expertise that industrial agent 
has. (Katramo & et. al. 2011: 22-24)  
 
5.1.2. Seller 
 
The Seller’s reasons to sell their business also include many strategic factors. These factors 
depend on the legal form and ownership structure of the firm. So, it is obvious that the reasons 
for selling the business for private entrepreneur and multinational enterprise are quite 
different. When the seller is a small business entrepreneur, the reasons to sell the business 
can be retirement, lack of development & research resources, taking advantage of good 
selling opportunity, the offspring is taking over the business or an external threat. The 
external threat can, for instance, be the change in market conditions or in competition 
position. In the case of global enterprise, the reason for selling the business is usually the 
concentration on core business function and as a part of updated strategy is to sell unsuitable 
business functions. Regardless the features of the seller, the selling process include certain 
goals that can be identified in every selling case.  
 
1) The seller thrives to maximize the selling price and to be successful in this goal, the seller 
has to find suitable buyer for the business.  
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2) The business must retain its daily capability of functioning and produce products and 
services for customers. 
 
3) To minimize the time and resources used for the selling process. 
 
4) To maintain the control over the selling process.   
(Katramo & et. al. 2011: 37-38) 
 
 
5.1.3. Questionable managerial motives for M&A 
 
M & As are a good option to enter new markets when an enterprise is already operating in 
new markets and this enterprise is undervalued. Katramo and his co-writers underline the 
importance of managerial competency as a part of successful M&A. The motive theory 
identifies three negative synergism impacts that can ruin the process. 
 
1) Arrogance of executive management: The executive management suffers from over 
confidence and believes that they are able to execute the M&A better than their rivals. This 
may lead to bad acquisitions and the acquiring price might be highly overvalued.  
 
2) Biased valuation process: The internal compensation system might encourage the 
executive management to take big risks when they are increasing the value of the company 
through mergers & acquisitions. There is a risk to exaggerate the benefits of mergers to gain 
bonuses. 
 
3) The lack of strategic planning: The process is executed without proper integration plan or 
without proper expertise. 
(Katramo  & et. al. 2011: 36-37) 
 
 
 
5.2 Theories that Decrease Merger Value 
 
As the motive theory stated in previous chapter, the theory identified three forms of negative 
synergism, arrogance of executive management, biasedness in valuation and insufficient 
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strategic planning.  In addition to the motive theory, the financial research has presented other 
reason for decreasing merger value. The research paper from Nguyen, Yang & Sung (2012) 
collect the main value decreasing motives for mergers that appear regularly in the financial 
literature. These value decreasing motives are Hubris, Agency problems and Market timing.     
 
Hubris was presented in Roll’s (1986) paper meaning a state of mind of key decision-making 
individuals in the organization whom rationality is blinded by their personal or corporate 
hubris. This makes the acquirer to pay too high premiums for the target company’s 
shareholders. The hubris even drives the corporate executives to close deals in which the 
acquirer cannot attain synergy benefits from the target. The Agency problems is wide concept 
of various principal and agent interest conflicts. Traditional agency problem is the 
shareholders’ interests against the executive management’s own interests in publicly traded 
company.  Interestingly Jensen (1986) mentions that agency problems are caused by the 
interest conflict of firm’s cash flows between the executive management and firm’s owners. 
The interest conflict arises, according to Jensen, in the view difference in the firm’s payout 
policy of firm’s excess cash reserves. The shareholders call for the excess cash to be paid as 
a form of larger dividends, when as the executive management see the inorganic growth 
through acquisitions to be the proper way to use excess cash. The agency conflict arises from 
the control issue of cashflows.  
 
The third value decreasing motive is market timing. Shleifer & Vishny (2003) studied in their 
paper the relation of merger transaction activity and stock market trends.  In their model, the 
mispricing of acquisitions is assumed and thus it is justified for bidder companies to 
overvalue their stocks to get better deals, in which the trade is conducted through stock 
change. The overvaluation of equity is a desirable state to have better purchase deals and it 
is also used prevent the company to become a target of acquisition itself. Companies with 
undervalued equity are under threat to be targeted for acquisitions or takeovers. According 
to their results the overvaluation tends to become an industry trend that affects bidder 
premiums of the whole industry. This forms a problem, when the buyer with overvalued 
equity buys a target company with undervalued equity, even though they both might be 
mispriced upwards due to the overvaluation trend of the stock markets. These motivational 
reasons may also occur simultaneously. Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993) found out that some 
acquisitions were involved with two or all the three previously mentioned motives. 
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5.2.1. Horizontal M&A 
 
Horizontal mergers involve corporations in the same field of business and the majority of 
completed mergers are classified as horizontal. In this case purchased and acquiring firm 
produces similar products and competes for same customers (Cowling, Stoneman, Cubbin & 
et. al. 1980: 16-17). The main gains from horizontal mergers are; increased production 
efficiency through economics of scale and reduced competition inside the particular field of 
business. These gains can increase the market share of the acquiring firm and expand its’ 
product portfolio. The reduced competition boosts the acquiring firms’ buying-and 
negotiation power and growing market power leads to more centralized markets. Too large 
market power and fully centralized markets are harmful to consumers and national economy 
as a whole. To avoid this progress, mergers with such impacts require license of execution 
from the antitrust officials. In U.S, Federal Trade Commission approves mergers with such 
impacts (Fee & Shawn 2004: 424-426). 
 
 
5.2.2. Vertical M&A 
 
Vertical merger take place between corporations at different stages of production. The 
purchased corporation and acquiring corporation participate in the products’ manufacturing 
process, but this participation happens at different stages of this manufacturing process. The 
acquiring firm can implement this integration towards the ultimate consumers or backwards 
to suppliers (Niemi 1991:14). The main objectives in vertical mergers are to improve 
efficiency of the supply chain through decision power consolidation and secure the supply of 
raw materials and channels in the production chain. These objectives can be achieved by 
dismantling operation clashes, warehouse re-organization and cut offs of profits from 
previous subcontractors.  In the earlier studies Kedia, Ravid & Pons finds evidence that 
vertical mergers generate greatest gains when dominant firms merge. The co-operation of 
these dominant corporations leads to more concentrated markets and growing market power 
cause abnormal returns (Kedia, Ravid & Pons 2011: 846-848). 
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5.2.3. Conglomerate mergers 
 
In conglomerate merger the purchased corporation and the acquiring corporation do not have 
functional similarity. The acquiring firm tries to pursue new markets with new products and 
customers. The purchased firm offers the infrastructure to enforce this aim. Conglomerate 
mergers can be considered as part of acquiring firm’s strategy to obtain new competition 
advantages, but conglomerate mergers also include many financial-and taxation benefits. The 
business operation related risks can be divided between different business units and if the 
risks materialize the damages are divided between these units. So, the risk management 
approach is similar with portfolio management. The acquiring firm can achieve financial 
benefits, when it is buying a company from new business field, and there is uncertainty in 
the purchasing price. In the best case acquiring firm can buy the company for undervalued 
price and benefit from this valuation error. The acquiring firm’s stockholders will benefit 
from this bargain deal, but unfortunately the process can go on the opposite direction as well 
and the selling price can be overvalued. In the situation, where the merger is funded mainly 
with debt liabilities, taxation benefits can be exploited. The interest rates for current liabilities 
can be deducted from corporation’s returns before taxes   (Lewellen 1971: 521-526). 
 
 
5.2.4. Concentric mergers 
 
In a concentric merger the acquiring firm’s business field is not directly related to the 
purchased firm’s business field and they do not offer same products. Still some similarities 
do occur and corporations may share same type of distribution channel, product development 
or research activities. The merger offers positive synergy gains for acquiring company. A 
textbook example from concentric merger is a car manufacturer who decides to start produce 
industrial machinery (Niemi 1991: 15). 
 
 
5.2.5. Going-private 
 
Boot, Gobalan & Thakor studied the reasons why publicly traded corporations go private. 
Going private is a process, where corporations sell functions what are unsuitable to their core 
business. Usually the support division’s management purchases the stock capital 
(management buy-out) and due these operations the stocks are no longer traded in public 
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stock exchange. If the ownership in this established private company is divided with a third 
party and the transaction is funded mainly with liability funds, the procedure is called 
leverage-buy-out. Boot, Gobalan & Tharkor find in their studies that going private will 
decrease the level of corporations’ stock price but also increase the volatility of stock price. 
The privatization will also increase the corporations’ overall value. Their studies also indicate 
that the autonomy of the management increases and going private procedure requires 
premium above the pre-transaction stock prices. The reduction in participation of public 
market investors encourages younger firms to go private. The gains, from going private 
procedure for this new private entity, are reduced listing-and transactions cost, decision 
power autonomy is concentrated to the management and corporations overall value is 
increased due to the transactions (Boot, Gobalan & Tharkor 2008: 2014-2024). 
 
The going private procedure can be executed by using tender offers. Tender offer is public 
offer or invitation to all stockholders to sell their shares for a bidding price. The tender offer 
is issued by acquiring company and does not need approval from acquiring company’s 
stockholders, so it is flexible alternative to arrange takeover. Tender offer does not violate 
minority stockholders’ rights and they are free to decide will they sell their shares (Niemi 
1991: 17). Earlier studies show results that, tender offer bid prices and the method of 
payments, have effects on stock prices after the public offer announcement. In his paper 
Travlos (1987) studied methods of payment and how they explain common stock returns in 
bidding firms at the time of announcement bids. His research hypothesis assume that cash 
based finance as payment method has positive effect on the bidding firm’s stock returns and 
common stock based financing as for has negative effect. Travlos’ research concludes that 
pure stock exchange transaction causes losses for the stockholders at the time of offer 
announcement. The research also concludes that cash financed payment methods causes 
normal earnings to the stockholders and the abnormal returns are explained with other 
factors; such as type of the acquisition or the bid premium margin (Travlos 1987: 944-962). 
 
5.2.6. Takeovers 
 
Takeover is an acquisition, where acquirer makes a bid to the acquiree for its stocks. 
Takeover is friendly transaction when collaboration between parties’ works and the process 
goes smoothly. Hostile takeover is completed without mutual agreement of the parties and 
the takeover is carried through without the approval of the target’s management. Usually 
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hostile takeover is executed in form of a tender offer or a proxy fight3. Takeover can be also 
executed in a form of a merger. In this procedure the usually the old legal entity ceases to 
exist and its funds and liabilities are transferred to the acquiring company (Schwert 2000: 
2599-2601). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: (classification of mergers as they are classified in this thesis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3A situation, where the acquirer will persuade shareholders to vote out the target’s management to get rid of 
takeover obstacle. 
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6. M&A AND IT-INDUSTRY 
 
6.1. Motives for M&A 
 
Competition in the business world is strict and corporations have to update their goals on the 
regular basis, if they want to maintain their operational functionality. Corporations must 
adapt to fast changing environments and seek out the competition advantage where ever they 
can find it. The corporations make strategic decisions to maintain or to improve its 
compatibility with the changing environment. To achieve this reconciliation with 
environment, corporation can alter itself or try to influence the environment itself (Niemi 
1991: 19-21). 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are one way of executing corporation’s strategy, the changes in the 
business environment, forces management to switch old strategic guidelines.  M&A can 
promote strategy process, when management wants to sell unsuitable divisions and focus on 
its’ core business areas or attain new knowledge, resources or technology to boost its’ already 
existing competence (Niemi 1991: 20-21). Company can form strategic alliances with other 
companies to develop expensive technology or to improve its standing in the markets, but in 
this thesis strategic co-operation is not studied. There are several motives that can be 
identified behind of M&A. These motives have been categorized differently in financial 
literature and usually the categorizing method depends from writer’s own personal approach 
to the topic.  
 
 
6.1.1. Synergism 
 
Synergistic benefits are created when the combined post-merger performance will be greater 
than the pre-merger performance of the separate merging companies together. The basic idea 
behind synergistic gains is that the post-merger corporation is more capable than either one 
of the merging parties alone. Due to these synergistic gains the performance increases: 
2+2=5. The synergism consist of many factors and their precise classification are challenging 
task but still there are some major variables that can be identified almost in every M&A. 
These synergistic features are shared tangible resources, improved management, shared 
know-how and pooled negotiation power (Mukherjee, Kiymaz & Baker 2004: 8-10).  
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The merging companies both benefit from the situation, where they share their key know-
how and expand their competence through co-operation. The acquiring company can 
improve the target company’s management qualities by replacing the old board of executives. 
This scenario is probable, when the target company has underperformed in its area of 
business and the cause for this underachievement lies in the managerial decisions or choices. 
The deteriorated state makes the target company a tempting object for purchase and due to 
these problems bidding price level can be set lower than normally. Sometimes combined 
market-and negotiation power of the acquiring-and the target company grows so large that 
the transaction need approval from the competition officials. In these cases, the outcome of 
the transaction depends from the permit, the parties either get it or do not get it. The merging 
companies can still achieve same kind effects through merger but without the permit 
proceedings. In this scenario the combined effects on markets and general competition are 
not so significant that separated permit for transaction is required. Despite the fact that merger 
is possible to execute without permit, the gains from transaction still exists. The impacts of 
these gains are materialized in smaller scale, but they could enable market price manipulation 
or restrictions to production volumes. Based on the competition official’s discretion a merger 
with harmful impact on the market competition could require a merger license4 (Krishna & 
et. al. 2007:435-437). 
 
In the information technology markets the synergy gain is additional value to the economic 
value created by the acquisition.  The successful execution of due diligence process enables 
the identification of synergy value sources and enables their proper exploitation. The proper 
due diligence execution also identifies the value destroyers of synergy or minimizes their 
impact. The higher the net synergy value is, the more sensible motive for acquisition exists. 
(DePhamphilis 2012: 339-341).  The synergy value can be separated into two types: 
operational synergy and financial synergy. The operational synergy consists of economies of 
scale and economies of scope. The economies of scale consist of the spread of fixed costs 
over the production steps. The fixed costs include the depreciation of tangible assets, 
amortization of intangible assets, maintenance expenditures and obligations. The fixes cost 
cannot be changed in short time window. The variable costs are costs that have impact on 
out-put levels. The economies of scope are defined as certain pool of skills or assets that are 
used to produce products or services. The financial synergy is the cost of capital for the 
                                                 
4In the US the merging companies need the approval from the Federal Trade Commission, if the market share 
excel 40 percent and this have effects on the national competition. In the EU the approach for permit 
requirement is based on the overall effects on the markets. The main objective is to prevent the merging 
companies to accomplish dominant market position.  
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acquiring firm meaning the minimum return that the investors expect to receive from the 
invested capital used in the acquisition.  
(DePhamphilis 2012: 5-7) 
 
The operational synergy is examined in more detailed level in the next section. The financial 
synergy gained through the acquisition can be measured through the cost of capital for the 
acquirers. Maksimovic & Zechner concluded in their paper (1991) that the existence of tax 
shield encourages the firms to make more risky investments, because the losses can be 
stabilized with cash flows from lower risk projects and Mackay & Philips (2005) concluded 
in their research that industry factors have effect on individual firm decisions, but also joint 
financial characteristic of the firms, which operate in the same industry sector. The important 
factor that affects the cost of capital is the Tobin’s Q ratio. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market 
value of the buying firm’s stock to the replacement costs of its assets. For example, the firm, 
which is considering of making an investment to equipment, can measure the option of 
acquiring a firm with acquiring price less than the costs of replacing the asset by buying it by 
themselves. Tobin’s Q ratio helps the firms to identify the undervalued take-over targets and 
exploit the undervaluation. If the Tobin’s Q ratio is less than one the acquisition would be 
profitable option to execute. Servaes finds in his paper (1991) that the abnormal returns are 
higher when the takeover target has low q-ratio and the acquirers have high Q-ratio. Tobin’s 
Q formula is drafted as followed: 
 
(12) Tobin’s Q = 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚
  
                             
 
The Q-ratio is measured between zero and one. If the ratio equals to one or higher, the market 
price is overvalued. If the ratio is under one, the price is undervalued.  
(Servaes 1991: 409-417) 
 
In the information technology markets the use of Tobin’s Q is challenging due to the large 
amount of intangible assets. The problems with valuation are the research & development 
expenses and their treatment as operating expenses instead of capital expenses. So, it is 
important to capitalize the research & development expenses as capitalization expenses using 
the formula introduced previously (formula 9). By doing so the amortization expense can be 
defined and the value for intangible assets reliably measured. The financial synergy is 
achieved, when the previous operation is properly executed, and the Tobin’s Q provides ratio 
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under one. In this situation the financial synergy is achieved through acquisitions and 
mergers.  
 
 
6.1.2. Economies of scale and scope 
 
When firms merge, their ability to produce goods and services, will most likely increase. 
Individual firm can perform tasks more efficiently than several firms separately by 
eliminating duplicate operations. Operational synergy enables the reduction of research-, 
general- and administrative costs and expands the production capacity. The trimming of 
duplicate business operations can save billions of dollars of merging corporations’ money, 
but the transactions causes negative effects in a form of losing jobs (Krishna, Healy, Bernard 
& Peek 2007: 435).  
 
Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz studied in their paper the effect of the acquiring firm’s size 
with the returns attained from the transaction. Their research data contained material from 
over 12 000 executed M&As. The acquiring companies were categorized into small and large 
firms by capitalization volume and these transactions took place during the time period of 
1980-2001. The sample firms spent 3.4 trillion dollars for these transactions and the large 
firms lost 312 billion dollars of the acquiring companies’ stockholders’ money. The small 
firms returned over 9 billion dollar yield from the same time period. The model used to 
calculate the earnings and loses is equity-weighted, but still even the value-weighted model 
offers similar results. Moeller’s and his colleagues’ research indicate that large firms destroy 
the acquirers’ wealth and the small ones return profit instead. This study does not observe 
other indicators than returns for the acquirer so the rational explanations for the larger 
mergers lie in other factors such as economies of scale (Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz 2004: 
201-204). 
 
In the information technology industry, the complementary products lead to that the 
producers have to offer the whole portfolio of products to the customers and this requires 
suppliers, distributors and operational corporate value chain. This value chain can be 
integrated to be more efficient through acquisitions. The value chain consists of logistics, 
production, marketing, distribution/sales and customer support. The effectiveness of this 
corporate value chain can be improved with proper integration process at the time, when the 
acquisitions are conducted. The forward integration starts from logistics and it extends 
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through the whole value chain into the customer support. The integration can also be done in 
reversed manner. This is called backward integration. (DePhamphilis 2012: 21). The 
information technology producers have to follow certain standards to make the products 
compatible with each other. This causes competition between market operators and forces 
the companies to seek competitive advantage through the value chain. The source of 
effectiveness for the value chain can be acquired through successful merger strategy. The 
mergers prevent transaction costs and terminate duplicate operations.  The right acquisitions 
compile all the skills and functions that are needed to gain competitive advantage through 
economies of scope.  
 
Economies of scale as a motive for acquisitions in the information technology industry are 
caused by the structure and features of the markets. The high research and development costs 
make the companies to acquire legal protection in form of patents and other Intellectual 
property rights, externalities of production, switching costs for customers make the 
acquisition favorable option, when seeking the competitive advantage.  Especially the patent 
protection of specific time period gives the owner the exclusive right to benefit from the 
innovation financially. The benefits of adjusted fixed costs, intangible assets with 
amortization possibility and long period of patent protection provide the acquiring company 
vast amount of operation synergy value. These factors distort the market structure and cause 
this distortion the information technology markets cannot be examined in the traditional 
manner (Campello & Graham 2013: 89-92). 
 
These features typically lead into concentration measures executed by market participants. 
Mergers and acquisitions reduce market competitions and raise the profit margin for market 
operators. In the monopoly situation the market operator is responsible for selling hundred 
percent of the market output. Monopoly markets are extremely rare and are usually formed 
with protective legislation. More accurate approach to measure market concentration is to 
identify the number of the firms that operate in the markets and the distribution of output 
among the market operators. The concentration of industry can be presented as followed: 
 
(13) ∑𝑖=1
𝑁 𝑠𝑖 =  
100∑𝑖−1
𝑁  𝑞𝑖
𝑄
= 100 
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where: 
si = the market share of the firm i 
N = the number of the firms in the industry 
Q = aggregate industry-output level 
qi = the output of the firm i 
si=  
100𝑞𝑖
𝑄
 = the percentage of the industry total output sold by firm i 
           
Note that  0≤si≤100 
(Oz 1996: 171-174) 
 
The mergers and acquisitions that lead into concentrated markets or provide too much market 
power and percentage for the acquiring company the competition official will prohibit the 
execution of the transaction. This is called the freeze-out mechanism.  
(Amihud, Kahan & Sundaram 2004: 1325-1328) 
 
 
6.1.3. Taxation gains 
 
The tax gains are achieved in a situation, where merger compensation is completed in form 
of stock exchange. The realization principle in taxation defines that only realized profits are 
taxable. So according to this principle, if the transaction involves cash payment or 
compensation, profits are counted as taxable funds. Certain countries have tax policies that 
allow the use cash payments as part of the transactions without obligation to pay capital gain 
tax. For instance, Finnish corporate taxation law allows ten percent of the combined nominal 
value of the stocks to be cash. The rest ninety percent of the merger price must be based on 
stock exchange or other arrangements as long as profit does not realize. Another important 
principle in corporate taxation is continuity. This principle requires that the companies 
continue to perform business after the merger. Otherwise the procedure is considered to be 
tax evasion (Järvenoja 2003: 62-63). 
 
In the U.S the basic taxation principle is built around citizenship. This principle allows the 
federal government to carry taxes from its citizens and corporations regardless their 
whereabouts. This principle enables many forms of tax planning. The U.S tax policy has its 
advantages and disadvantages, and they can be exploited in tax planning. One goal in the 
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international taxation is to avoid the double taxation of income. This means that the income 
of multinational consolidated corporations is taxed in its country of origin and the same 
income is taxed again in country, where the income is created. International tax deduction 
treaties are signed to eliminate double taxation (Huizinga & Voget 2009: 1222-1240). 
 
Taxation procedures are different between cross-border mergers and national mergers. At the 
national level the method of the arrangement influences the transaction taxability.  As a rule, 
for cash payments are that they usually taxable and the tax-percent depend from the taxation 
state. If profits realize during the merger the capital gain tax must be paid. The tax-free 
treatment requires continuity of business after merger (Moden: 1993: 30-31). The 
comparison between finish and American taxation procedures indicate that the basic 
principles are similar. U.S taxation laws affect cross-border acquisitions in a way or another 
and the effect depends from the home country of the acquirer. The domestic acquisitions are 
taxed by the U.S tax laws and foreign acquisitions are taxed as per foreign-and U.S tax 
legislation. Taxes paid to foreign countries can be utilized in the domestic taxation. The 
foreign tax credit (FTC) can be from deducted marginal tax rate, but deduction cannot be 
greater than the amount of payable taxes in U.S from foreign income source (Manzon, Sharp 
& Travlos 1994: 1894-1895). 
 
The foreign tax credit limitation (FCTL) can expressed as followed: 
 
(14) FTCL= US marginal tax rate*foreign source income 
(Manzon & etc 1994: 1895) 
 
If the foreign tax rate is higher than the U.S marginal tax rate, the difference is compared to 
FTCL. In the case, where FTC exceeds the FTCL, the remaining FTC can be used within 
next five years or refund paid taxes from last two years. The tax gains are achieved through 
the tax rates of U.S and the foreign country, and availability to use excess foreign tax credit. 
The repatriated profits from low tax rate countries can cause additional taxes in U.S, if the 
company doesn’t have any usable FTC left to balance tax installment. So, in this situation, 
tax gains are reached if the company has a lot of unused FTC excess. The FTC excess will 
become unusable in five years. In the circumstance, where the foreign tax rate is higher than 
U.S tax rate, the gains come through in form of FTC excess. This FTC excess can be used as 
described above (Manzon & etc 1994: 1896-97). As a conclusion M&A have tax gains, when 
the transaction is executed in form of stock exchange or only certain portion of merger price 
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is cash. Also, the use of FTC excess can bring tax gains in form of cross-border M&As. Still 
tax gains are seldom the major motive for M&As, because big tax gains are easily considered 
to be tax evasion. 
 
Figure 2. Figure indicates the relations of firms characteristic and host country tax rate in the 
eyes tax payer. (Mazon1993:189) 
 
 Host country tax rate 
 
 
Firms characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned earlier in the conclusions of Maksimovic’s and Zechner’s paper (1991) the tax 
shield encourages firms to make more risky investments and the deductibility of debt interest 
in the company’s taxation increases the use of debt leverage and affects the cost structure. 
The taxation benefit enables the tax planning in the consolidated enterprises and is potential 
explanatory factor for mergers and acquisition. 
 
 
6.2 Acquisition Process 
 
6.2.1. Pre-merger phase 
 
The planned merger or acquisition is a complicated process that involves many steps before 
and after the announcement date, when the deal is announced to the general public.  
DePhamphilis has divided the acquisition process into a comprehensive ten phase process 
diagram. The diagram is presented as followed: 
Neutral 
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Figure 3. The Ten steps of Merger process (Dephamphilis 2012: p. 139) 
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concept of the acquirer’s general business management. Typically, the merger policy is part 
of the general operational plans of the company as an important source of likeable growth 
potential.  The business plan acts as statement of purpose for the company’s business and 
includes internal analysis and external analysis of company’s business functions and position 
in the markets. Business plan provides an executable strategy for the company on how to 
compete on the markets and gain a competitive advantage in relation to the competitors. The 
second phase of the process is called acquisition plan and it is also an essential part of the 
business plan as well. Acquisition plan supports the execution of business plan and its 
primary purpose is to identify potential acquiring targets. Through these acquisitions the 
company can attain growth and know-how to its business by adding the bought business 
functions as part of its own enterprise. Usually the companies have their own acquisition 
function, which are responsible for drafting the acquisition plans and actively search and 
screen potential acquisition candidates. 
 
The phases three and four require acquisition function’s active effort and capability of 
identifying potential acquisition targets and proper prioritization of the candidates in order to 
achieve sustainable competitive advantage through their acquisition activities. The firm’s 
strategic goals and weight factors will vary through time, so it is important that the acquisition 
function collects and updates the potential candidate list to match up the firm’s current 
strategic situation. The screening phase focuses on prioritizing the potential targets of 
acquisitions in accordance with the acquirer’s current strategic requirements set for the 
specific acquisition. In the fifth phase the acquirer will start to contact the potential target 
companies based on priority order set in screening phase. The negotiation phase is complex 
process involving stakeholders in the acquiring company as well as the target company. 
Additional stakeholders may vary from external consultants such as investment bankers or 
the employees of the target company. (Dephamphilis 2012: 136-177) 
 
6.2.2 Negotiation phase 
 
The negotiation phase is often described as the most time consuming and complex phase of 
the acquisition process. It involves the representatives of the acquiring company and target 
company as well as several external stakeholders. The terms and details of the deal are 
structured and put together during this phase. It is impossible to name all the sub-phases of 
negotiation phase, thus each negotiation is different depending on the features of the deal, 
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but Dephamphilis has listed certain phases that can be found in the vast majority of the deal 
negotiations.  The different negotiation phases can be listed as followed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Negotiation phases according to Dephamphilis (2012: 179).  
 
The deal negotiation process starts by calculating the value of the target company. This 
calculation offers some orientation angle to the final deal price and financing plan. Both 
parties usually present their own perception of the value of the target company and the final 
deal price sets between these two perceptions as a result of a compromise. The valuation is 
based on historical financial data of target company’s performance and probable future 
performance forecasts. Typically, the final deal price is specified on more detailed level, 
when the negotiation process proceeds. The second sub-phase of the negotiation phase is the 
deal structuring, which is an encompassing stage, in which parties agree on deal execution 
specifics and possible sources of disagreements. Deal structuring requires firm specific 
information and data on target company’s condition and strategic fit on acquirer’s viewpoint. 
The required information is acquired through due diligence processes, which are a necessary 
procedure of information gathering in the acquirer’s perspective. The due diligence process 
guarantees that the target company records are investigated throughout, and possible hidden 
risks are brought to buyer’s attention.  The due diligence process overlaps other negotiation 
phase sub-phases and may last through the whole negotiation phase. After, the data provided 
by the due diligence process is analyzed, the acquirer and its advisors compose a financial 
plan how to finance the deal. The deal can be financed with cash, stocks of the acquiring 
company or the mix of previously mentioned. The final sub-phase of the negotiation is the 
decision-making, in which the acquirer either decides to buy the target company or walk 
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 3. Due 
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away from the deal. Depending on, if the acquirer decides to continue the deal, the process 
either dries out or continues to seventh phase of the Dephamphilis’s acquisition phase 
diagram. (Dephamphilis 2012: 178-185) 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3. Post-merger phase 
 
The acquirer and the target company usually have their own business practices, 
organizational culture, management style and operating functions and they do not necessary 
fit with each other without proper integration procedures and steps. To enable smooth 
transition period in the acquiring and the target company, an integration plan is usually 
drafted. Integration plan contains clear steps and phases on how different processes and assets 
are bind together cost effectively. The integration plan operates as a groundwork for the 
integration phase. The integration phase is one of the most important phases of the acquisition 
process due though integration the acquirer may achieve considerable synergy benefits. The 
proceeding order of the post-acquisition phases is not necessarily clear, and the phases can 
overlap with each other or change places with each other. The closing phase ends the actual 
acquisition negotiations and the parties sign the purchase agreement. After the closing phase 
the pre-drafted integration plan is activated, and integration processes begin. The final phase 
measures the success of the acquisition and the benefits achieved through the deal. Typically, 
the merger success is measured with pre-set indicators that measure the performance on 
different levels of corporation. It is important not to overlook the meaning of the integration 
phase as it will define in large extent the quality of the newly formed corporate culture and 
practices. (Dephamphilis 2012: 186-194) 
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7. DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
7.1 Data description  
 
The sample consists of 132 mergers and acquisitions in which the buyer is always a publicly 
listed company in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The selected time window covers 
a time period of 1995-2006 and it is separated in three different periods. The pre-bubble 
period covers time frame of 1995-1999, bubble-period of 2000-01 and post-bubble period of 
2002-2006. The actual crises period is only to be examined as part of the whole-time period 
of 1995-2006, because the number of crises period acquisition deals is simple just too low to 
attain robust results. The crises period is described more detailed in the descriptive results. 
The data is constructed as a combination of two different portfolios. The first portfolio 
includes publicly listed acquirers from all other industries than high technology and 
information communication, which have acquired high technology or information 
technology target companies. The second portfolio consists of publicly listed acquirers 
operating in high technology or information communication technology industries and which 
have acquired target companies from other industries than high technology and information 
communication. The selection criterion for this structure is to measure the performance for 
all companies involved with high technology and information communications and compare 
this performance with average performance of technology industry. The technology industry 
is formed as a proxy and it contains all publicly listed technology companies in the specified 
country. Data is collected from Datastream provided by Thompson Reuters. All the prices 
are daily closing prices for the specified companies and the sample includes also companies 
that have been delisted, if their stock has been imposed for public securities trading 12 
months after the merger announcement. The currency rates and their conversion rates are 
obtained from OFX.  
The mergers must fill the following conditions to be included in the portfolios.  
 
1) The acquirer has acquired at least 50 percent of the target company’s stocks or 
increased its ownership below 50 percent over the 50 percent threshold.  
 
2) The later deals are omitted from the sample, if the acquirer is involved in many 
acquisitions during the time period. 
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3) The mergers have to be classified as completed deals to ensure the fact that the 
transactions really were executed. 
 
4) The deal value has to exceed one million euros in order to limit the effect of small 
transaction deals of biasing the results.   
 
5) Acquirer has to be publicly listed company and its stock has to be traded publicly at 
least one day before the deal was announced.  
 
The event study methodology assumes the market efficiency to capture the event effects to 
test the research hypotheses. According to Fama’s and Malkiel’s (1970) paper the efficient 
market hypothesis is divided to three different forms of efficiency, weak-, semi-strong and 
strong forms of efficiency. Weak-form of efficiency states that the historical prices cannot 
be used to acquire abnormal returns. In semi-strong efficiency the prices include all available 
public information and in the strong-form efficiency the prices contain all public and 
privately available data. Brown and Warner (1980) underline the event study method as 
straightforward test of market efficiency. This is mainly due to the fact all the market 
information is reflected quickly on prices and the event, merger in this case, can be captured. 
 
 
 
7.2 Methodology 
 
The chosen methodology for the empirical part of the thesis follows event study method, 
where the stock performance of the acquirer is considered on -1/+1 day around the merger 
announcement date. The event window is also extended to cover different event periods of -
7/+7 days, 1-month, three months, six months and twelve months to guarantee reliable results 
of acquirer performance also on the longer time scale. The data observations are spread on 
three different time periods of pre-bubble period, bubble period and post-bubble period. The 
benchmark portfolio is formed as a proxy to measure the post-merger performance of 
acquiring firms and compare this performance against the average performance of technology 
industry. The technology industry portfolio is constructed by bundling all the technology 
related companies together and calculating them technology industry average returns. Four 
different benchmark portfolios are created to cover each Nordic country and the general 
technology mean average returns are formed based on the returns of technology companies 
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listed in that country. Previous studies have used Book-to Market or Firm Size as reference 
portfolio proxies, but in this thesis technology industry is chosen as proxy. The formed four 
portfolios covering the four Nordic countries are then combined as single Nordic technology 
benchmark portfolio providing the daily mean average returns for Nordic technology 
companies. 
 
 Individual company’s weight on the formed benchmark index is achieved by using weight 
factors. The weight factor is calculated by comparing the company’s market value to the 
combined market value of the technology companies included in the benchmark index. The 
weight factors are calculated and updated on quarterly basis and all the prices are transformed 
to U.S dollars to guarantee the comparability of the companies included the Nordic 
Technology index. This selection is rational considering the unique features of technology 
companies and the vast amount of intangible assets employed in the high technology 
business. This may distort the comparability with general indices traditionally used as 
benchmarks in financial sciences.  Usually general indices consist of companies operating in 
very different industries and possessing features that are not so common in technology 
industry or the number of technology companies is too low to represent their unique effect 
sufficiently as part of the general index. As so, it will increase the reliability of the 
performance comparison, when the actual benchmark index consists purely on companies 
that operate in the same field as the acquirer companies, which are involved with technology 
related mergers. Even though several technology based general indices exist on global scale, 
the Nordic markets are too marginal to have their own general technology index at the time 
of the Dotcom crises5. In this thesis, a separate technology index is built to serve as a 
benchmark index for companies that have conducted technology related mergers or 
acquisitions. In addition, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the acquirer stock 
performance in pre-Dotcom crises time period and post-Dotcom crises period.   The length 
of the estimation window is 12 months prior the merger announcement date, in which the 
security related alphas and betas are calculated in order to calculate the abnormal returns.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 It is important to notice that modern Nordic Technology index N9000EURGI was established at the beginning 
of 2000, while the inspection window of this study covers time period of 1995-2006. Due to this a separate and 
earlier benchmark index is required in order to capture the industry returns for earlier years.  
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7.2.1 Short-term financial performance 
 
According to Mckinlay’s paper (1997) the event study is a useful method for capturing short-
term impacts around certain events. In this thesis event study method is selected to capture 
short-term acquirer stock price fluctuations around the merger announcement date. The 
typical one factor-model used to measure short-term performance is the market model.  
 
(15) 𝐸( 𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  
 
where 𝐸( 𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected normal return for specific security i on time period-t, the 
acquirer company in this thesis, 𝛼𝑖   and 𝛽𝑖 are parameters of market model, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the 
reference market return (the benchmark index) and 𝜖𝑖𝑡  is the error term. Market model is 
used to calculate the expected normal returns for acquiring company. So, the next logical 
step is to define abnormal returns. The methodology part follows the methods presented by 
Mackinlay’s paper (1997) of calculating short term profitability for the acquiring firm. The 
abnormal returns are defined by using the following model. 
 
(16) 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)  
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal return from the acquisition event, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of the 
acquiring firms stock and the rest of the equation is the expected return presented in the 
previous formula (15). The short-term event windows used in this thesis are 1 days, 7 days, 
30 days, 90 days and one year.  
 
When the abnormal returns for every executed merger events are defined, they will be 
included in the portfolios. The average abnormal returns are calculated for the portfolios for 
specified time periods are acquired with following formula. 
 
 
(17) AAR = 
1 
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐴𝑁𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  
 
where, AAR is the average abnormal return for acquiring companies after the merger, N is 
the total number of the companies that have executed merger transactions and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the 
abnormal return for specific stock included in the stock portfolio. When the average abnormal 
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returns are calculated for the different time periods, their cumulated abnormal returns can be 
obtained with following formula.  
 
(18) 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2) =  ∑ 𝐴
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 
where, the abnormal returns are summed up from the whole event window between t1-t2. 
This is cumulative return for single event type among multiple observations of merger events. 
Usually the merger and acquisition research, which exploit event study methodology, 
contains many individual merger observations. These individual observation events’ 
cumulative abnormal returns can be extended to cover the whole portfolio by defining the 
average cumulative abnormal returns with following formula.  
 
(19) 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2) = 
1
𝑛
 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2)𝑛𝑖=1  
 
where, the 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2) is the cumulative average abnormal returns for the time periods t1-t2 
for all individual events and the 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) is the cumulative abnormal returns for 
individual merger observation events. This enables the identification of merger impacts on 
short-term.  
 
The simple t-statistics are used in this thesis to test statistical significance of abnormal returns 
caused by the merger events on 5 percent significance level. The significance of abnormal 
returns is tested on pre-crises period, whole time period and post-crises period. The 
parametric simple t-test requires that the abnormal returns follow the normal distribution. 
The t-test follows the following formula.  
 
              
(20) 𝑡 =
?̅?−𝑢0
𝑆/√𝑛
 
  
where,  𝑡 is the statistical significance weighted against the 5 percent significance level, ?̅? is 
the average mean of cumulated abnormal returns for the sample,  𝑢0 is the zero hypothesis, 
S is the standard deviation of the error in the sample and n is the overall number of the 
observations included in the sample. The zero hypothesis in this case is that merger events 
did not generate abnormal returns. In other words, 𝑢0 equals zero. 
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The reason for selection of one-factor based model of measuring the short-term market 
performance is that the usage of multifactor models in event studies are restricted. According 
to McKinley’s paper explanatory power of additional factors used in multifactor models 
possess only limited capability to explain the market performance. This is due to the variance 
related issue of the additional factors capability to reduce the variance of abnormal factors. 
The variance reduction of abnormal returns can be achieved through market benchmark 
portfolio formation by selecting firms with similar attributes or similar operating industries. 
In this thesis the variance reduction is attained through the formed benchmark index, which 
consists of publicly traded companies operating in the technology industry in the Nordics. 
The short-term performance methodology is needed to test the first hypothesis. 
 
 
 
7.2.2 Long term financial performance 
 
The previous merger research has presented two different ways to measure long-term 
financial performance. First method is called calendar-time portfolio approach and the 
second one is buy-and hold return approach. Both methods require the building of stock 
portfolios. Usually the time window extends to months and even years, when measuring the 
long-term performance and this causes several problems to the reliability of the results. Lyon, 
Barber & Tsai (1999) underline the problems in their paper by stating that cross sectional 
dependency between the sample observations may distort the t-statistics and investor 
experience in post situations is not properly measured.  The investor experience may be not 
measured correctly, because the skewness bias, rebalancing bias and survivor bias. Skewness 
bias means that the long run abnormal return distribution is positively skewed, and this 
distorts the t-statistics. Rebalancing bias are caused by the periodic calculation of benchmark 
portfolio returns, that are rebalanced every time the periodic calculation is made, compared 
to not rebalanced sample merger firm returns. Survivor bias arise, when the merger sample 
firms are followed in the long-term event window, but the benchmark portfolio firms start 
their trading in the following month to the event month. The buy-and hold return approach 
can be used to avoid most of these problems by constructing the benchmark portfolios in a 
way that survivor- and rebalancing bias are excluded from the portfolios. The skewness bias 
can be controlled by using the standard statistical skewness corrected version of t-statistics 
and by keeping the estimation window sufficiently short.  
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The calendar-time portfolio method eliminates the cross-sectional dependency between the 
sample observations. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997) used this 
method in practice in their research and were able eliminate most of the cross-sectional 
dependency, but unlike buy-and hold approach, the calendar-time portfolio method does not 
take investor experience into account. In this thesis the buy-and hold return approach is used 
to measure the long-term performance. This is mainly for the reasons of data availability and 
investor experience measurement, but also topic sets certain requirements. Lyon & et.al. 
(1999) mention in their paper that in the construction of benchmark portfolios and sample 
companies it is not necessarily sufficient to use book-to-market and firm ratios, when 
determining the reference companies for portfolios. They recommend of using other 
variables. In this thesis the used variable for benchmark portfolio constructing is the industry, 
where the acquirers and target companies operate. The chosen industries are high technology, 
technology and telecommunications. These industries were mostly affected by the Dotcom 
bubble and the company characteristic similarities in the Nordic markets encourage 
measuring the acquirer performance in the specified time-periods. The survivor- and 
rebalancing bias are controlled by selecting the benchmark companies from the same 
operational industry and by calculating the industry return based on these companies. The 
skewness bias and cross-sectional dependency problem is controlled by keeping the long-
term estimation window short. In this thesis the maximum long-term period is 12-months. 
Other term used is 6-month period. The intended contribution of this thesis is to investigate 
merger returns on short-and long-term time window in the Nordic markets before, during and 
after the Dotcom bubble. There is very limited selection of research papers available 
concerning information technology mergers in the Nordic markets. The buy-and hold returns 
are calculated by using the following formula: 
 
(20) Buy-and hold return = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
12
𝑡=1
 - 1 
 
in where,  
 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = raw return of the acquirer stock i in the event month t.  
 
In order to calculate the buy-and hold abnormal returns the buy-and hold returns of the 
acquired firms are subtracted with the buy-and hold returns of the Nordic Technology 
benchmark index. The buy-and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are formulated with the 
following formula:  
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(21) Buy-and hold abnormal return =  ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ) −
𝐻
𝑡=1
 ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝐵,𝑡 )
𝐻
𝑡=1
 
 
In which,  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = raw return of the acquirer of the stock 𝑖 in the event month 𝑡. 
𝑟𝐵,𝑡 = the return on benchmark index companies. 
 
 
To test the second hypothesis the two-sided conventional t-test is conducted with a following 
formula:  
 
(22) 𝑡𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 =  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐻)/√𝑛
 
 
 
In where, 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 = mean buy − and hold returns of the acquirers. 
𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐻)/√𝑛 = standard deviation of buy-and hold abnormal returns included in the 
sample consisting of n firms.  
 
The long-term methodology follows the Ritter’s paper (1991) and Barber’s & Lyon’s paper 
(1997), in which separate matching firm portfolios are formed as a benchmark for acquirers’ 
average buy-and hold returns for specified time periods. The matching firms are selected 
based on their similar attributes with the acquirer companies. In this thesis, the matching 
companies are selected according their operating industry, which is the Nordic technology. 
The acquirers form five different portfolios, one for each Nordic country and fifth is the 
Nordics as a whole. Then buy-and hold returns are counted for each of them for 6 months 
and 12 months event periods and the results are compared against Nordic Technology index 
benchmark buy-and hold returns. This will indicate, if the acquirers have performed more 
poorly than their Nordic technology industry. 
 
Jakobsen and Sorensen have studied IPOs long term stock performance in the Danish markets 
in their paper (2001) and this study is one of the few available papers in the Nordic markets 
measuring the long-term stock performance with buy-and hold returns. They used data 
derived between the years 1984-1997 of the listing companies noted in the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange. They concluded in their study that the listing firms’ long-term performance 
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underperforms the Total Danish Stock Index. This cannot be used as a direct comparison to 
mergers, but still earlier studies of IPOs and mergers indicate underperformance to their 
benchmark indices, so certain indication of buyer’s underperformance on the long run can be 
drawn from their findings. Another significant paper from the Nordics is also published by 
Jakobsen et. al. (2000) and it focuses on long-term merger performance of the buyer. Their 
major finding underlined is that the acquiring firms underperformed the market index by 10.4 
percent after three years, respectively. In contrast with the Nordic literature, the implication 
is to expect underperformance of acquirers to be present in the short-term as well as long-
term time periods.  
 
The third hypothesis, which states; There is a difference between pre-crises buy-and hold 
abnormal returns and post-crises buy-and hold abnormal returns created by mergers and 
acquisitions, is tested with conventional t-statistics for samples with unequal variances and 
sample sizes by using following formulas.  
 
(23)   𝑆𝐸𝑆  =  √
𝑠1  
2
𝑛1
 + √
𝑠2
2
𝑛2
 
 
As both unequal variances and unequal sample sizes can be taken into consideration at the 
same time through weighted average of standard errors, the t-statistics can be then calculated 
as followed: 
 
(24) 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =  
Ῡ1−Ῡ2
𝑠𝑒𝑝
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8. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
8.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The results of short-term and long-term profitability are presented on this part of the study. 
The Benchmark Index used in this thesis is called the Nordic Technology Index and it is 
composed of the companies, which were publicly listed in any Nordic stock exchanges and 
were not involved in acquisitions in the specified time period. The Nordic Technology index 
consists of 455 companies that have operated technology industry in the Nordic markets 
between 1995-2006. Some of the companies have gone bankrupt, bought out or delisted for 
some other reason. In these cases, their weight is removed from the index during the quartile 
update check in which the company related weights are recalculated and updated, if 
necessary. The Table 1 describes the descriptive statistics related to the daily returns and 
performance of the Nordic Technology Index during the whole investigation period of the 
1995 to 2006. The descriptive statistics for the benchmark index are stated in the table 1.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Nordic Technology Index.  
 
Mean 
Average 
Daily 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Return 
Maximum 
Return 
Kurtosis Skewness Variance 
 
0.00061  
 
 
0.0169 
 
 
-0.119 
 
 
0.1167 
 
 
5.021 
 
 
-0.179 
 
 
0.00029 
 
 
The average daily returns of the benchmark index do not provide as clear indication on the 
overall development of the benchmark index than the daily prices. The better perception can 
be attained from the Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Development of the Nordic Technology Index between 1995-2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Figure 5 indicates the daily prices of the Nordic Technology Index and the effect of the 
Dotcom crises can been seen clearly as sudden rise of prices between 1999-2000 and 2001, 
when the technology stock prices collapsed nearly 60 percent less than eight months.  Ofek 
and Richardson (2003) studied in their paper the reasons for the sudden technology stock 
rise, which started in early 1998 and lasted until February of 2000. During that time the 
Nasdaq Composite Technology Index rose nearly 150 percent. After the February 2000, the 
index fell staggering 40 percent in less than three months. It is interesting to observe that the 
Nordic Technology Industry stock pricing follow similar rising and declining pattern that can 
be observed in the U.S technology stocks between the years 1998-2001. In the Nordics the 
drop, in the beginning of crises, was not steep as in U.S markets and the price decline started 
earlier than in the Nordics. The development of the Nasdaq Composite Index can be found 
in the Figure 6.  
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The most interesting observation that Ofek and Richardson brought up in their paper was 
comparison between Nasdaq Composite Index and S&P 500 index performance and their 
reaction to Dotcom crises. As Nasdaq Composite Index consists mainly on technology 
stocks, it is more sensitive to react on industry related shocks than S&P 500, which comprises 
of stocks from various industries, technology, being only one industry among them. The S&P 
500 index rose 40 percent from early 1998 into February 2000, which is considerably less 
than the Nasdaq Composite or Nordic Technology index did rise in the same time period. 
Also, the decline was not as steep as than with Nasdaq Composite index or Nordic 
Technology index, which fell 40-60 percent less than eight months.  S&P 500 fell less than 
ten percent in the same period. The S&P 500 development is described in Figure 7. The 
sensitivity factor, which depends on index stock composition, can have large effect on index 
fluctuations, so it is justifiable to use Nordic Technology index as a benchmark proxy for the 
companies involved with technology mergers and acquisitions to increase the comparability 
of the results and improve the robustness of the results.  
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Figure 7: Development of the S&P 500 Index between 1995-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2. Short-term Performance Results 
 
This sub-chapter presents the short-term abnormal returns attained through methodology 
presented in the previous chapter. The time periods under inspection are pre-crises period 
covering the acquisition conducted from 1995 until August 1999, post-crises period covering 
the transaction executed after August 2001 and the whole period of 1995 to 2006. Each time 
periods consists of five event windows around the actual acquisition announcement date. 
These event windows are 1-day, 7 days, 30-days, 90-days and one year after the merger 
announcement. The usage of five different windows enable to investigate the short-term 
profitability also semi long-time frame. If any of the event window dates are banking holidays 
or other non-trading days, the event date is transferred to next trading day. The mean 
abnormal returns are derived with market model for each Nordic country and Nordics as a 
whole. The whole-time period of 1995-2006 included 132 technology related mergers, in 
which 69 were conducted in Sweden. The table 2 indicates the cumulative mean abnormal 
returns for each Nordic country.  
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Table 2, Cumulative average abnormal returns of acquirers between 1995-2006. 
The short abnormal returns for the whole event period of 1995-2006.   
  1 day   7 days   1 month   3 month    12 month   
Sweden                     
CAAR 0.006   0.000   -0.007   -0.053   -0.185   
T-stat (1.1)   (.03)   -(.46)   -(1.24)   -(2.29) ** 
S.dev 0.044   0.074   0.127   0.356   0.667   
S.Error 0.005   0.009   0.015   0.043   0.081   
Observations 69   69   69   69   69   
D.f 68   68   68   68   68   
Finland                     
CAAR 0.003   0.004   0.044   0.085   -0.006   
T-stat (.75)   (.72)   (1.75) * (1.92) * -(.06)   
S.dev 0.017   0.027   0.116   0.203   0.441   
S.Error 0.004   0.006   0.025   0.044   0.096   
Observations 21   21   21   21   21   
D.f 20   20   20   20   20   
Denmark                     
CAAR 0.001   0.000   -0.018   -0.007   -0.011   
T-stat (.22)   (.)   -(.53)   -(.14)   -(.08)   
S.dev 0.021   0.048   0.163   0.259   0.680   
S.Error 0.004   0.010   0.034   0.054   0.142   
Observations 23   23   23   23   23   
D.f 22   22   22   22   22   
Norway                     
CAAR -0.006   -0.028   -0.021   -0.104   -0.435   
T-stat -(.82)   -(1.94) * -(.86)   -(2.4) ** -(1.92) * 
S.dev 0.034   0.064   0.106   0.189   0.989   
S.Error 0.008   0.015   0.024   0.043   0.227   
Observations 19   19   19   19   19   
D.f 18   18   18   18   18   
Nordics                     
CAAR 0.003   -0.003   -0.003   -0.031   -0.162   
T-stat (.87)   -(.58)   -(.24)   -(1.16)   -(2.63) *** 
S.dev 0.036   0.064   0.131   0.305   0.710   
S.Error 0.003   0.006   0.011   0.027   0.062   
Observations 132   132   132   132   132   
D.f 131   131   131   131   131   
*/**/***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level.          
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The acquiring companies provide zero abnormal returns or insignificant abnormal returns on 
1-day or 7-days event windows. The abnormal returns tend to turn negative as longer the 
event window is extended. Finland was an exception with positive abnormal returns of 4.4% 
and 8.5% in one-month and three months event windows after the event date, respectively. 
The 12-month event window provides slight negative abnormal return in Finland. Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and the Nordics as a whole, provided mainly negative abnormal returns 
and magnitude of negative abnormal returns seem to grow larger with the extension of the 
event window. The two-way t-statistics test was then conducted to indicate, if the abnormal 
returns were significantly different from the return provided Nordic Technology Index, 
which is used as proxy for average market return. The t-statistics indicated no statistical 
significance at 5% level for positive abnormal returns for the whole period. Finland attained 
some (4.4% and 8.5%) positive abnormal returns on 10% significance level, but the 
significance was not sufficient to fulfill the required significance level of 5%.  
 
More interestingly, t-statistics test revealed that the negative abnormal returns were 
statistically significant in Sweden, Norway and Nordic markets. The significance is stronger 
the longer the event window is extended. Norway and Sweden provided negative abnormal 
returns, which were statistically significant at 5% level at 3-and 12-month event windows. 
The most interesting find was the statistical significance of negative abnormal returns for 
Nordic markets at 1% significance level at 12-month event window. This indicates that the 
Nordic acquirers performed much worse than the Nordic technology industry in general did. 
The findings support the hypothesis 1, which stated: Mergers and acquisitions did not 
provide abnormal returns for acquirer’s stockholders in Nordic-markets neither in short-
term or long-term time frame. On the contrary, the findings support completely opposite that 
the acquisitions made the acquirers to perform more poorly than the Nordic technology 
industry in general on short- and long-time frame. Next step is to examine, if the same result 
applies into pre-crises and post-crises periods. The time window from August 1999 into 
August 2001 is excluded to investigate the performance without period of highest volatility 
of the crises. The tables 3 and 4 present the results for pre-crises and post-crises periods.  
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Table 3, The pre-crises cumulative average abnormal returns 
The short abnormal returns in pre-crises period of 1995 until August 1999   
  1 day   7 days   1 month   3 months   12 months 
Sweden                     
CAAR -0.001   -0.006   -0.003   0.012   0.043   
T-stat -(.11)   -(.27)   -(.11)   (.3)   (.56)   
S.dev 0.030   0.090   0.125   0.164   0.327   
S.Error 0.007   0.021   0.030   0.039   0.077   
Observations 18   18   18   18   18   
D.f 17   17   17   17   17   
Finland                     
CAAR 0.004   0.007   0.045   0.112   -0.062   
T-stat (.45)   (.9)   (1.13)   (2.74) * -(.62)   
S.dev 0.018   0.016   0.089   0.091   0.221   
S.Error 0.008   0.007   0.040   0.041   0.099   
Observations 5   5   5   5   5   
D.f 4   4   4   4   4   
Denmark                     
CAAR 0.000   0.013   0.045   0.073   0.118   
T-stat (.03)   (.94)   (2.17) * (2.07) * (.91)   
S.dev 0.023   0.049   0.075   0.127   0.463   
S.Error 0.006   0.014   0.021   0.035   0.128   
Observations 13   13   13   13   13   
D.f 12   12   12   12   12   
Norway                     
CAAR -0.017   -0.050   0.018   -0.082   -0.477   
T-stat -(1.2)   -(1.79)   (.51)   -(1.21)   -(1.75)   
S.dev 0.031   0.062   0.079   0.151   0.609   
S.Error 0.014   0.028   0.035   0.068   0.273   
Observations 5   5   5   5   5   
D.f 4   4   4   4   4   
Nordics                     
CAAR -0.002   -0.004   0.021   0.032   -0.009   
T-stat -(.43)   -(.33)   (1.25)   (1.3)   -(.13)   
S.dev 0.027   0.072   0.105   0.155   0.447   
S.Error 0.004   0.011   0.017   0.024   0.071   
Observations 41   41   41   41   41   
D.f 40   40   40   40   40   
*/**/***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level.          
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Table 4, The post-crises cumulative average abnormal returns 
The short abnormal returns in post-crises period of September 2001 until 2006   
  1 day   7 days   1 months        3 months   12 months 
Sweden                     
CAAR 0.002   0.007   0.021   0.049   0.023   
T-stat (.27)   (.6)   (1.07)   (1.16)   (.3)   
S.dev 0.035   0.061   0.111   0.241   0.438   
S.Error 0.006   0.011   0.020   0.043   0.077   
Observations 32   32   32   32   32   
D.f 31   31   31   31   31   
Finland                     
CAAR -0.002   0.005   0.047   0.088   0.037   
T-stat -(.37)   (.68)   (1.55)   (1.55)   (.3)   
S.dev 0.015   0.025   0.106   0.197   0.429   
S.Error 0.004   0.007   0.031   0.057   0.124   
Observations 12   12   12   12   12   
D.f 11   11   11   11   11   
Denmark                     
CAAR 0.006   -0.009   0.007   0.040   0.030   
T-stat (.97)   -(.46)   (.23)   (.69)   (.17)   
S.dev 0.016   0.049   0.072   0.144   0.433   
S.Error 0.007   0.007   0.014   0.029   0.058   
Observations 6   6   6   6   6   
D.f 5   5   5   5   5   
Norway                     
CAAR 0.019   0.014   0.033   0.005   -0.121   
T-stat (1.43)   (.6)   (.98)   (.07)   -(.78)   
S.dev 0.035   0.061   0.090   0.166   0.413   
S.Error 0.013   0.023   0.034   0.063   0.156   
Observations 7   7   7   7   7   
D.f 6   6   6   6   6   
Nordics                     
CAAR 0.004   0.005   0.027   0.051   0.009   
T-stat (.87)   (.74)   (1.9) * (1.76) * (.15)   
S.dev 0.031   0.055   0.106   0.219   0.439   
S.Error 0.004   0.007   0.014   0.029   0.058   
Observations 57   57   57   57   57   
D.f 56   56   56   56   56   
*/**/***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level.            
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The table 3 indicate that abnormal returns have the tendency to turn positive and larger, when 
the event window covers the pre-crises period. The 12-month event window provided 
negative abnormal returns in Finland and Norway and slight negative return in Nordics as a 
whole. Despite of the positive abnormal returns none of the event windows were not 
statistically significant on 5% level. Danish acquirers attained positive abnormal returns at 
10% significance level at one-month and 3-months event windows and Finland at 3-months 
event window. The results reveal that the pre-crises abnormal returns were not statistically 
significant in any Nordic country or the markets as a whole. The results support the first 
hypothesis that the mergers and acquisitions would not provide abnormal returns for the 
acquirers. Findings are in line with results attained from the whole period, with the difference 
that the whole inspection period indicated that the acquisitions made by acquirers performed 
more poorly than the Nordic technology industry in general did.  
 
The table 4 provides results for the post-crises period. The trend of appearance of positive 
abnormal returns and their larger magnitude can be identified also in post-crises period. The 
post-crises period did not neither provide statistically significant results at 5% level or reveal 
significant negative abnormal returns on 5% level unlike the whole inspection period did. 
Nordic markets were significant at 10% level at one-month and three-months event windows 
and hence provided slightly higher positive returns than the Nordic technology industry as a 
whole. Any of the selected study periods (pre-crises, post-crises or whole period) did not 
produce statistically significant positive abnormal returns on short-term or semi long-term 
time period. Therefore, the first hypothesis holds true pointing out the mergers did not 
produce positive abnormal returns for acquirers on short-or semi long-term time frame. On 
the other hand, the whole-time period provided statistically negative abnormal returns in 
Nordics, Norway and Sweden, but in the pre-crises and in the post-crises periods this trend 
was absent. It seems likely that the crises peak period between August 1999 and August 2001 
have affected the results of the whole inspection period causing significant negative abnormal 
returns for the whole-period. The findings were in line with the findings of Jakobsen’s and 
Voetmann’s results (2003) concerning the overlapping time period of pre-crises. Neither did 
not provide significant abnormal returns for acquirers. 
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Buy-and hold returns for the whole time period of 1995-2006
                  6 months                    12 months
Sweden Average BHR of Acquirers 0.057 0.007
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.108 0.138
BHR abnormal returns -0.051 -0.131
S. dev 0.402 0.485
T-stat -1.06 -2.25 **
Observations 69 69
Finland Average BHR of Acquirers 0.124 0.150
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.058 0.135
BHR abnormal returns 0.066 0.015
S. dev 0.312 0.525
T-stat 0.97 0.129
Observations 21 21
Denmark Average BHR of Acquirers 0.098 0.320
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.238 0.410
BHR abnormal returns -0.140 -0.089
S. dev 0.405 0.864
T-stat -1.66 -0.50
Observations 23 23
Norway Average BHR of Acquirers -0.108 -0.131
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.176 0.229
BHR abnormal returns -0.284 -0.360
S. dev 0.443 0.673
T-stat -2.80 ** -2.33 **
Observations 19 19
Nordics Average BHR of Acquirers 0.051 0.065
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.132 0.198
BHR abnormal returns -0.082 -0.134
S. dev 0.409 0.611
T-stat -2.29 ** -2.51 **
Observations 132 132
*/**/***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
8.3 Long-term Performance Results 
 
Table 5, Buy-and hold returns for the whole time period 
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In contrast with the second hypothesis, Acquisitions did not provide positive buy-and hold 
abnormal returns on the long term,  the whole event period provided, as described in the 
table 5, positive buy-and hold returns for the acquirers with the exception of Norwegian 
acquirers, which returned  negative buy-and hold returns. The Nordic Technology Index 
(which consists of firms operating in High Technology, Technology or Information 
Technology in the Nordics and were not involved in acquisitions) provided higher buy-and 
hold returns for the stockholders than the technology firms involved in acquisitions. Due to 
this, even though the buy-and hold returns were positive for the acquirers, the buy-and hold 
abnormal returns formed to be heavily negative for the acquirers. The only exception was 
Finland in which the buy-and hold abnormal returns were higher than the benchmark index 
provided, and Finland returned positive 6.6 percent at 6-month time period and positive 1.5 
percent at 12-month time period, respectively. The acquirers underperformed their 
benchmark matching companies (The Nordic Technology Index) in Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway as well Nordics as a whole in the event window covering the whole time period.  
The findings validate the second hypothesis, which stated that acquisitions did not provide 
positive buy-and hold abnormal returns for the acquirer. Norway, Sweden and Nordics as a 
whole, provided statistically significant underperformance for the acquirers at 5% 
significance level in time period. In Sweden the statistical significance was present only at 
12-month time frame.  
 
In Sweden the acquirers underperformed the benchmark index by 5.1 percent in six-month 
time frame and 13.1 percent on 12-month time period. In Denmark the abnormal buy-and 
hold returns were negative by 14.0 percent at 6-month time frame and negative 8.9 percent 
at 12-month time period. Norway acquirers underperformed the benchmark index by 
staggering negative 28.4 percent at 6-month time frame and negative 36.0 percent at 12-
month time period. Nordics abnormal buy-and hold returns formed to be negative as well 
with 8.2 percent negative return at 6-month time frame and negative 13.4 percent at 12-month 
time period. Even though the underperformance was statistically significant in Norway, 
Sweden and Nordics as whole at 5% significance level, the results may be distorted as the 
crises period of 2000-2001 is included in the sample. Finland was the only Nordic country, 
which provided positive buy-and hold abnormal returns, but they were not statistically 
significant. The second hypothesis is validated for the whole time period in contrast with the 
results and Nordics as a whole returned statistically significant underperformance at 5% 
significance level. Still to minimize the distortion caused by the crises period the buy-and 
hold abnormal returns are scrutinized through two sub-periods (pre-crises and post-crises 
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Buy-and hold returns for the pre-crises period of 1995 until August 1999
                           6 months                            12 months
Sweden Average BHR of Acquirers 0.198 0.300
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.207 0.372
BHR abnormal returns -0.010 -0.072
S. dev 0.472 0.561
T-stat -0.09 -1.06
Observations 18 18
Finland Average BHR of Acquirers 0.174 0.076
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.274 0.369
BHR abnormal returns -0.100 -0.293
S. dev 0.121 0.167
T-stat -1.80 -3.81 **
Observations 5 5
Denmark Average BHR of Acquirers 0.222 0.494
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.283 0.638
BHR abnormal returns -0.061 -0.144
S. dev 0.490 0.983
T-stat -0.45 -0.53
Observations 13 13
Norway Average BHR of Acquirers -0.356 -0.372
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.191 0.644
BHR abnormal returns -0.547 -1.016
S. dev 0.283 0.469
T-stat -3.86 ** -4.33 **
Observations 5 5
Nordics Average BHR of Acquirers 0.139 0.262
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.255 0.551
BHR abnormal returns -0.116 -0.289
S. dev 0.454 0.754
T-stat -1.64 -2.45 **
Observations 41 41
*/**/***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
periods) to minimize the effects of the crises period of 2000-2001. The tables 6 and 7 presents 
the results for these sub-time periods.  
 
Table 6, Buy-and hold returns for pre-crises period 
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Buy-and hold returns for the post-crises period of September 2001 until 2006
                       6 months                               12 months
Sweden Average BHR of Acquirers 0.145 0.148
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.099 0.199
BHR abnormal returns 0.046 -0.051
S. dev 0.361 0.401
T-stat 0.72 -0.72
Observations 32 32
Finland Average BHR of Acquirers 0.099 0.207
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR -0.009 0.087
BHR abnormal returns 0.108 0.120
S. dev 0.360 0.607
T-stat 1.37 0.68
Observations 12 12
Denmark Average BHR of Acquirers 0.032 0.130
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.106 0.166
BHR abnormal returns -0.075 -0.036
S. dev 0.190 0.483
T-stat -0.96 -0.17
Observations 6 6
Norway Average BHR of Acquirers 0.011 -0.017
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.039 0.105
BHR abnormal returns -0.028 -0.122
S. dev 0.251 0.339
T-stat -0.30 -0.95
Observations 7 7
Nordics Average BHR of Acquirers 0.117 0.141
The Nordic Technology 
Index  Average BHR 0.073 0.164
BHR abnormal returns 0.044 -0.023
S. dev 0.341 0.461
T-stat 0.98 -0.38
Observations 57 57
*/**/***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Table 7, Buy-and hold return for the post-crises period 
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The table 6 indicates the buy-and hold abnormal returns for the pre-crises period of 1995-
1999. The acquirers returned higher buy-and hold returns than they returned during the whole 
time period (with exception of Norway), but so did the Nordic Technology Index as well. 
This inflicted that acquirers’ buy-and hold abnormal returns turned out to be negative for 
each Nordic country as well as Nordic markets. The 12-month period returned slight negative 
buy-and hold abnormal returns in Sweden and Denmark. Finland returned staggering 29.3 
negative buy-and hold abnormal return and underperformance was significant at 5% 
significance level. Norway and Nordics performed considerably worse than their benchmark 
index and their underperformance were statistically significant at 5% significance level. The 
6-month time frame provided slight negative buy-and hold abnormal returns in Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark.  Norway and Nordics caused statistically significant 
underperformance and were significant at 5% significance level. The pre-crises period results 
validate the second hypothesis as the whole Nordic markets underperformed its benchmark 
index at 5% significance level.  
 
The table 7 indicates the results for post-crises period and it did provide some positive buy-
and hold abnormal returns for acquirers. Sweden, Finland and Nordics as a whole returned 
some positive buy-and hold abnormal returns for the acquirers and actually managed to 
perform better than their benchmark index at 6-month time frame. Norway and Denmark lost 
to their benchmark index slightly at 6-month time period. The 12-month period returned 
positive abnormal buy-and hold returns in Finland as the rest of the Nordic countries and 
whole Nordic market returned negative abnormal buy-and hold returns. None of the countries 
or Nordic markets as a whole did not provide statistically significant results. So, the second 
hypothesis could not be invalidated or validated for the post-crises period. The results 
concluded in regard of the second hypothesis indicate that the acquirers underperformed in 
Norway, Sweden (12-months and whole time period), Finland (12-months and pre-crises 
period) and Nordics as a whole at 5% significance level for the whole period of 1995-2006 
and the pre-crises period of 1995-99. The post-crises period did not provide any statistically 
significant results considering the performance, but the abnormal returns were more positive 
and higher compared to the whole- or pre-crises periods. The second hypothesis could be 
validated for the pre-crises period as well as the whole period, but not for the post-crises 
period and so the second hypothesis could not be validated completely.  
 
Majority of the countries produced positive average buy-and hold returns through all time 
periods (whole-time period, pre-crises period and post-crises period), but the acquirers did 
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Buy-and hold return results for the sub-period difference
6 months 12 months
Sweden Pre-crises Post-crises Pre-crises Post-crises
BHAR
-0.010 0.046 -0.072 -0.051
Var 0.236 0.134 0.334 0.166
t-stat -0.42 -0.58
Finland
BHAR -0.100 0.108 -0.293 0.120
Var 0.018 0.142 0.035 0.402
t-stat -1.93 * -1.99 *
Denmark
BHAR -0.061 -0.075 -0.144 -0.036
Var 0.260 0.043 1.047 0.280
t-stat -0.36 -0.41
Norway
BHAR -0.547 -1.016 -0.028 -0.122
Var 0.100 0.073 0.275 0.134
t-stat -2.55 ** -3.60 ***
Nordics
BHAR -0.116 0.044 -0.289 -0.023
Var 0.211 0.118 0.583 0.216
t-stat -1.89 * -1.98 *
*/**/***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
underperform compared to their benchmark matching companies of similar industries that 
were not involved with acquisitions. Generally, the acquirers underperformed their 
benchmark index. Interestingly the post-crises period did not provide any statistically 
significant results as other periods did and this raises the third hypothesis under scrutiny.  
 
Table 8, Results for the sub-period difference  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the results in the table 8 indicate nearly all the countries returned negative abnormal buy-
and hold returns. Only Finland (6 and 12-month periods and post-crises period) and Sweden 
(6-month period and post-crises period) provided positive abnormal buy-and hold returns.  
Nordics returned a modest abnormal return of 4.4 percent on 6-month time period. In the 
contrast of the third hypothesis; There is a difference between pre-crises buy-and hold 
abnormal returns and post-crises buy-and hold abnormal returns created by mergers and 
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acquisitions, the results show statistically significant results for Norway, Finland and Nordics 
as a whole. In Finland and Nordics as a whole the post-crises period performed better than 
the pre-crises period and were statistically significant at 10% significance level. Even though 
the significance is not sufficient to validate the third hypothesis at 5% level, the 10% 
significance indicate that there is a solid difference in abnormal returns provided by pre-
crises and post-crises time periods.   In this case the post-crises period returned higher returns 
than the pre-crises period did. This is in line with the findings of Campello, Graham & Harvey 
(2010) in which they concluded that financial turmoil influences merger performance and 
activity. The higher returns of post-crises period may also be explained with managerial 
hubris and risk aversion of business decision makers. As a result of depression, the risk 
aversion of decision makers tends to increase as the managerial hubris tend to decrease due 
to the losses caused by the crises.  
 
In Norway the results were contrary, and the pre-crises period performed less worse than the 
post crises time frame. Interestingly the results were statistically significant at 5% and 1% 
significance level. Still small sample sizes of 5 and 7 are too few to draw a widening 
conclusion. In the next section the findings of the study are concluded and summarized.  
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis the data sample consists of 132 Nordic acquirers that were involved with M&As 
in the high technology or information communication technology industries during the time 
period of 1995-2006. Timing-wise the time frame is placed in the the fifth merger wave, 
which was mainly driven by knowledge-based industries and high intangible asset valuation. 
The wave ended as the Dotcom bubble went bust in 2001 and the rapid decline in merger 
activity followed the crises. In the light of previous financial literature, the mergers and 
acquisitions are driven by various motives and strategic economic reasons, but the main 
consensus dominating the narrative underlines the positive synergy benefits for main reason 
for executing mergers and acquisitions. Due to the transaction the company is more valuable 
than the sum of its parts or the former companies separately. Still the results of previous 
research are more or less contradictory covering the business rationality or positive post 
acquisition performance of M&A’s.  
 
In this thesis the focus is to study the M&A performance in the Nordic markets over decade 
of time covering the Dotcom crises period of early 2000. The selected industries were chosen 
to be high technology and information communication technology as they were most likely 
to be affected by the fifth merger wave, which was driven by the rise of knowledge-based 
industry trend. The measurement method is short-term and long-term performance of the 
acquiring firm and the level of its’ performance compared to the industry benchmark, which 
is Nordic technology in this thesis. The intended contribution of this thesis is to examine the 
Nordic technology merger market during the fifth merger wave and find out if the mergers 
will underperform in the Nordics as they do in the majority research papers in which the data 
is derived from other markets such as U.S or U.K. There is only very limited supply of 
research papers available covering the Nordic markets in the time of Dotcom era, which 
underlines the ambition to study the topic in more detailed level. Other major contribution 
point of this thesis compared to previous literature is the build up of the separate benchmark 
index (Nordic Technology Index) in order to capture suitable matching benchmark as 
industry proxy for measurement of merger performance of acquirers. The current technology 
index, N9000EURGI, was established in the beginning of 2000 and covers only part of the 
whole inspection window used in this thesis.   
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The measurement methods for merger performance in this thesis are short-term and long-
term financial performance and the research hypotheses are formed based on the previous 
literature. First the previous literature behind the first hypothesis is summarized to set up the 
expected results for the short-term financial performance. The first hypothesis stated:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Mergers and acquisitions did not provide abnormal returns for acquirer’s 
stockholders in Nordic-markets neither in short-term or long-term time frame. 
 
The hypothesis is based on the findings of previous literature, which indicate significant 
underperformance for the acquiring firms. Schoenberg (2006) concluded that over 50 percent 
of British acquirers suffered from negative abnormal returns between the years of 1988-90. 
Some other studies (Martynova et.al 2006; Shantanu 2009; Carper 1990) state that mergers 
did not produce significant abnormal returns for the acquiring companies. The results of 
previous studies indicate a tendency of underperformance for the acquirers. The short-term 
financial performance is measured with market model in this thesis and the results show 
statistical significance of underperformance for the acquirers, when the time window covers 
the whole time period of 1995-2006.   
 
The empirical results revealed that the negative cumulative abnormal returns were 
statistically significant in Sweden, Norway and Nordic markets. The significance is stronger 
the longer the event window is extended. Norway and Sweden provided negative cumulative 
abnormal returns, which were statistically significant at 5% level at 3-and 12-month event 
windows. The most interesting find was the statistical significance of negative cumulative 
abnormal returns for Nordic markets at 1% significance level at 12-month event window. 
This indicates that the Nordic acquirers performed much worse than the Nordic technology 
industry in general did. So, the hypothesis could be validated concerning the positive 
cumulative abnormal returns, because the statistical significance of positive abnormal returns 
was absent. The hypothesis is invalidated for the negative abnormal returns as the 
underperformance of the acquirers returned statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns. Finland was the only country which returned positive abnormal returns, but they 
were only significant at 10% significance level, which is not sufficient to invalidate the 
hypothesis for the case of positive abnormal returns.  
 
The results for the sub-periods of pre-crises and post crises did not show statistical 
significance at 5% significance level. Some positive cumulative abnormal returns were 
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significant at 10% significance level in Denmark, Finland and Nordics as a whole. Still the 
results were not sufficient to invalidate the first hypothesis.  Therefore, the first hypothesis 
holds true pointing out that the mergers did not produce positive cumulative abnormal returns 
for acquirers on short-or semi long-term time frame. On the other hand, the whole-time 
period provided statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal returns in Nordics, 
Norway and Sweden, but in the pre-crises and in the post-crises periods this trend was absent. 
It seems likely that the crises peak period between August 1999 and August 2001 have 
affected the results of the whole inspection period causing significant negative cumulative 
abnormal returns for the whole-period. The previous literature indicated a tendency of 
underperformance for the acquirers and as light of empirical result this seem to hold true in 
the Nordics also.  
 
The long-term performance is measured with buy-and hold returns in this thesis for time 
periods of 6 and 12-monthts after the merger announcement date. The method was selected 
in order to include the investor experience as part of the results. The cross-sectional 
dependency may cause skewness bias on longer time periods and to control this issue the 
time frame of long-term performance has been set to maximum of twelve months. This 
should prevent distortion of the distributions. The rebalancing and survivorship bias brought 
up by Lyon, Barber & Tsai (1999), are controlled through the construction and update of 
benchmark portfolios.  Based on the previous merger literature covering the long-term 
merger performance, the acquisitions did not return positive abnormal buy-and hold returns 
for the acquiring companies (Jensen & Ruback 1983) and the times of economic turmoil have 
an effect on acquirers’ merger activity (Campello, Graham & Harvey 2010). These findings 
form the base for the second and third research hypotheses of the thesis.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Acquisitions did not provide positive buy-and hold abnormal returns on the 
long term. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a difference between pre-crises buy-and hold abnormal returns and 
post-crises buy-and hold abnormal returns created by mergers and acquisitions.   
 
The empirical results conducted on the Nordic data support partially the earlier findings. 
Sweden, Norway and Nordics underperformed their benchmark index at 5% significance 
level. Norway and Nordics were significant at both periods of 6-months and 12-months and 
Sweden at 12-month period. As the results indicate the second hypothesis is supported by the 
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Nordic data and thus it can be validated for the whole time period of 1995-2006. The results 
for pre-crises period of 1995-1999 provide similar results than the whole time period. During 
the pre-crises period Finland, Norway and Nordics underperformed the markets at 5% 
significance level at 12-month time period. In Norway the underperformance was also 
statistically significant at 5% level at 6-month period. Interestingly the post-crises period of 
2001-2006 did not provide any statistically significant results, but the returns were higher 
compared to pre-crises and to the whole time-period. The results support the validation of 
the second hypothesis at pre-crises time period and whole time period due to the 
underperformance of acquirers. The results do not support the validation or invalidation of 
the hypothesis for the post-crises period. The Nordic data is in line with the findings of 
Jakobsen & Voetman (2003), which indicated slight underperformance for the Danish 
acquirers and with the results of Tuch & O’Sullivan (2007), which indicated acquirer 
underperformance in U.S and U.K.  
 
The results for buy-and hold abnormal returns were different between pre-crises period and 
post-crises period as the pre-crises period showed statistical significance of 
underperformance for the acquirers and as for the post-crises this feature was absent.  As the 
earlier literature suggest the depressions influence the merger activity of the acquirers and 
the sub-period results show difference in the pre-crises and post-crises results, thus the third 
hypothesis becomes under scrutiny. In contrast with the empirical results Finland and 
Nordics performed better during post-crises period than in the pre-crises period and the 
difference was significant at 10% significance level. This is an indication of difference in 
returns between the sub-periods, but the results were not significant at 5% level meaning that 
the third hypothesis could not be validated. In Norway the pre-crises period returned smaller 
negative returns than post-crises period and the difference was statistically significant at 5% 
and 1% significance level at 6-month and 12-month time periods, respectively. In the light 
of the results the third hypothesis could not be validated as the results provide only few 
statistically significant results with small sample sizes. Still the significance of 10% level in 
the Nordics as a whole on both time periods show that certain tendency of sub-period 
difference does exists.  
 
The empirical results indicate that the Nordic technology mergers are not so different from 
other industries as the findings are in line with older studies. The tendency of sub-period 
difference between the pre-crises and post-crises provided by the Nordic data and earlier 
research can be explained by behavioral approach introduced by Roll (1986) and Sleifer & 
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Vishny (2003). During the pre-crises period the managerial hubris tend to increase due to the 
vast amount of available loan money and increased merger activity. This leads often to biased 
merger premiums and underperformance of acquirer firms. After an economic turmoil the 
risk aversion of business managers increase and managerial hubris decrease. This leads to 
better merger performance due to the better decision-making. Economic results indicate that 
tendency for sub-period difference could be identified even though it was not statistically 
significant at 5% level.  
 
The empirical results of this thesis are partially in line with the findings of previous studies. 
The M&As tend to underperform their benchmark industry in the Nordics as well and the 
managerial hubris of behavioral approach introduced by Roll may have caused at least some 
difference between the subperiods of pre-crises and post-crises even though it was not 
statistically significant at 5% level. In the future it would be interesting to extend the data to 
cover other industries as well such as logistics and financial services, in which the amount of 
tangible assets can be considered low and see if underperformance do occur on the other 
industries as well.  
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